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*The Department of State*

# bulletin

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**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A MUTUAL SECURITY  
PROGRAM • Message of the President to the Congress . 883**

**TASKS CONFRONTING THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT •  
by Assistant Secretary McGhee . . . . . 892**

**A GLOBAL FOREIGN POLICY • by Francis H. Russell . 895**

**COMMUNIQUE ON SETTLEMENT OF GERMAN  
EXTERNAL DEBTS . . . . . 901**



*For index see back cover*



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## Recommendations for a Mutual Security Program

### *Message of the President to the Congress*<sup>1</sup>

[Released to the press by the White House May 24]

Three weeks ago I transmitted to the Congress a request for 60 billion dollars for the United States defense establishment during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1952.

I am now recommending for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1952, a Mutual Security Program as follows:

(1) Military assistance to other free nations in the amount of 6.25 billion dollars.

(2) Economic assistance to other free nations in the amount of 2.25 billion dollars, primarily to support expanded defense efforts abroad.

These amounts compare with 5.3 billion dollars appropriated for military assistance, and 3 billion dollars for economic assistance, in the current fiscal year.

#### **Extent and Design of the Program**

The program for our own Armed Forces and this Mutual Security Program interlock. The one builds upon the other. The purpose of each is the security of the United States—the security of American lives and homes against attack and the security of our rights and liberties as law-abiding members of the world community.

Our country has greater economic strength and larger potential military power than any other nation on earth. But we do not and we should not stand alone. We cannot maintain our civilization, if the rest of the world is split up, subjugated, and organized against us by the Kremlin.

This is a very real and terrible danger. But it can be overcome. To do so, we must work with the rest of the free world: we must join other free nations in common defense plans; we must concert our economic strength with theirs for the common good; and we must help other free coun-

tries to build the military and economic power needed to make impossible the Communist dreams of world conquest.

This is hard common sense and sound economy. The dollars spent under the Mutual Security Program will build more strength in support of our security than we could build at home with the same expenditure of funds.

This Mutual Security Program brings together our various foreign-aid programs, including the arms aid of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, economic assistance for Europe—now being directed primarily to support of rearmament—and our economic aid to underdeveloped areas under the Point 4 concept. Every one of these programs has proved its worth.

In preparing the present recommendations, each of these separate programs has been revised in the light of the emergency situation that exists in the world and the extraordinary demands that are being placed on our Nation. The amounts, the geographical areas, and the purposes of the aid have all been chosen in order to bring about the greatest possible increase in the security of the United States and the whole free world.

Under this program, the United States will send tanks, guns, and planes to a number of free countries, in Europe and other parts of the world, which are building up armed forces against the threat of Communist attack. We will also send economic help to a number of countries—economic help ranging from machinery and materials with which to make weapons, to seeds, medicine, and technical assistance with which to conquer communism's allies of starvation and sickness.

This program was designed with three major characteristics of the Soviet threat in mind:

First, the Soviet threat is world-wide. In Europe, in Asia, in our own hemisphere, the strategy of the Kremlin concentrates on trying to pick off the free countries one by one, so that their resources and people can be organized against the rest of the

<sup>1</sup> H. doc. 147, 82d Cong., 1st sess. Also printed as Department of State publication 4236.



free world. That is why the Mutual Security Program includes essential help to free countries all around the world which are exposed to the danger of internal or external Communist pressures.

Second, the Soviet threat is total, it affects every form of human endeavor. Communist attack may come in the form of armies marching across frontiers; or it may come in the form of internal subversion. Economic warfare, psychological warfare, political infiltration, sabotage, the marching of armies—these are interchangeable aggressive weapons which the Soviet rulers use singly or together according to shifting calculations of greatest advantage. That is why the free world must concentrate upon building not only military strength, but also economic, political, and moral strength. That is why the Mutual Security Program includes economic as well as military assistance.

Third, the Soviet threat is of indefinite duration. The free world must take into account both the possibility that the Soviet rulers may soon start all-out armed aggression, and the possibility that they may carry on their aggressive tactics for many years by measures short of all-out war.

That is why the task of the free world now is not only to build defenses urgently in the immediate future, but also to prepare for the long pull. We of the free countries must make preparations now so that when our armed forces have been built up we will be able to maintain them for years, if necessary, and at the same time grow in underlying economic strength more soundly and more rapidly than the Soviet dictatorship.

#### **Resources Provided by the Program**

The free nations have the resources and the will to overcome all these aspects of the Soviet threat. Together, our potential strength is enormous. The free nations have 75 percent of the world's industrial capacity and most of the world's raw materials.

Most important of all, free men, all around the world, have the determination to stop Communist aggression and to achieve peace. The Communist aggression in Korea dispelled any lingering doubts that the Kremlin is willing to threaten the peace of the world.

The job before the free nations is to organize their potential resources and together to convert them into actual military and economic strength. Our associates in the free world are now making vigorous efforts to this end. The Mutual Security Program will provide them with resources required to supplement and make effective their efforts. It is not a program under which we will carry the rest of the free world on our backs. It could not succeed if that were the case. The program is founded on the principle of mutual effort and the knowledge that we can help effectively only those who help themselves.

The proposed aid is related to the resources available to each recipient country, its economic stability, and the burdens it has assumed. Our aid will be provided only for essential needs that the country cannot meet by its own efforts. The need for aid will be continuously reviewed in the light of each country's performance and of economic and political changes.

The bulk of the assistance under the Mutual Security Program will be military equipment. Most of this will go to our partners in the North Atlantic Treaty, but, in addition, substantial quantities will be supplied to nations in Asia and the Middle East. Military equipment to supplement their own will be provided to countries when they have organized forces which require this equipment in order to become effective fighting units. With our assistance, the free world as a whole will be able to strengthen its military defenses rapidly. Without such aid, the necessary build-up would be dangerously delayed if not impossible.

In addition to supplying military equipment, this program will provide economic aid for a number of countries. In most countries in Europe, and in some countries in other parts of the world, this economic aid will enable the recipients to carry on larger defense programs than would otherwise be possible. In a few cases, some further economic help is necessary to continue progress toward recovery. In Asia and other underdeveloped areas, this program will enable the people to make headway against conditions of poverty and stagnation which are principal assets of Soviet infiltration.

The condition of the people in the underdeveloped areas would be a matter of humanitarian concern even if our national security were not involved. Major improvement in these conditions is necessarily a long-term process, in which the countries' own efforts, private investment, and public developmental loans should play the largest part. Carefully selected projects of technical assistance and initial development on a grant basis, however, can speed up this process and provide tangible benefits even in the short run.

The underdeveloped countries in Asia, South America, and Africa produce strategic materials which are essential to the defense and economic health of the free world. Production of these materials must be increased. Loans and developmental help are needed. The development of the resources of those countries helps them by raising their standard of living and increasing their resistance to Communist subversion, and helps the whole free world by increasing the supply of raw materials essential to defense and to an expanding world economy.

To enable the underdeveloped areas to expand their production of strategic materials, they must be assured of being able to obtain the essential supplies and equipment they need from our country. Indeed, our entire security program will be



successful only if the materials available to the free world are distributed in the way that will best contribute to the build-up of total free world strength. The Mutual Security Program, like the program for our own Armed Forces, has been examined from the standpoint of the availability of supplies, materials, and equipment that are required to carry it out. We believe these resources can and must be made available out of the expanding production of the free world.

In each area, the United States aid which I propose will be a small part of the total resources available for military and economic purposes—but that small proportion is crucial. In all these areas of the world, larger amounts of United States assistance could be put to good use and would pay real dividends. But I have limited the assistance I am recommending to what is absolutely necessary, under the emergency conditions we are in today, to help those countries build essential military and economic strength.

#### Division of Funds

I propose that the total funds required under the Mutual Security Program be divided as follows:

#### Mutual Security Program, 1952

(In millions)

	<i>Economic</i>	<i>Military</i>
EUROPE -----	1,650	5,240
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTHERN AFRICA -----	125	415
ASIA -----	375	555
LATIN AMERICA -----	22	40
Administrative Expenses -----	78	
	<hr/> 2,250	<hr/> 6,250

The military aid for Greece and Turkey is included in the amount for the Middle East. The amount of the economic aid for Europe includes the economic aid for Greece and Turkey. For convenience, the estimated requirement for administrative expenses for the entire program—approximately 78 million dollars is shown as a single figure under economic aid.

The amounts requested for economic aid include 13 million dollars to be furnished the United Nations and the Organization of American States for their technical assistance programs.

The economic, as well as the military aid recommended, is grant assistance to be provided through appropriated funds. Loans by the Export-Import Bank will also continue to play an important role in our efforts to assist the economic progress of friendly countries. In order that full use may be made of the opportunities for loans, especially to develop strategic materials, I recommend that the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank be increased by 1 billion dollars. Not all of the increased lending authority, of course, will be used in the coming year.

With this program of assistance to the total free

world effort, we will move forward rapidly toward a situation giving reasonable assurance against aggression.

Moreover, the Mutual Security Program is designed to taper off as soon as our safety will permit. The creation of effective military forces in being, coupled with increased productivity, will make it possible, within a few years, for most areas of the free world to maintain their defenses and sustain their economies without further grant assistance from this country.

The creation of this strength will provide a defensive shield against aggression for all the free world. Ever since the war, the free nations have been going forward to develop their resources and improve the lot of their people. Ever since the war, the free nations have been working together to create a world community in which each nation, respecting world law, can play its distinctive and honorable role.

The only kind of war we seek is the good old fight against man's ancient enemies—poverty, disease, hunger, and illiteracy. This is an effort which makes use of the great elements of our strength—our economic power, our science, our organizing ability, our political principles, our enthusiasm as free men with faith in the future. This is an effort to build, not to destroy; to grow in freedom and justice and mutual respect; to replace the force of arms with the force of peaceful change.

We have no doubt about the outcome of this free world effort. But we must be strong and we must have strong partners if we are to discourage new acts of violence by the power-hungry, and to win the opportunity to carry on our work of peaceful progress.

For the time being, therefore, the emphasis in our cooperation with the other free nations must be on building our defensive shield against aggression. This shield threatens no one. It will never be used for aggression. But it will be used instantly for defense.

The strengthening of the free world along these lines is the best hope of producing changes in the policies of the Soviet Union without a world war. Military defense forces will put a stop to the Kremlin's hope of easy conquest. Growing prosperity in the free countries will frustrate Soviet political warfare. In these circumstances, the Soviet rulers will face growing internal pressures. The peoples under Soviet control will grow more and more restive under the burden of an aggressive and futile policy of hostility toward the whole world. The rulers of the Soviet Union will be forced by these pressures to abandon their policy of aggression.

It is too early to predict how or when this policy will change. But this program of mutual security will help to bring about such a change. It is certain that the united vigor and cooperative action of the free world can produce such results if we act in time. No system based on slavery and terror

can long withstand the tremendous human energies that are released by the advance of freedom.

### Critical Areas To Be Defended

#### EUROPE

For the security of the United States, for the survival of freedom in the world, free Europe is a critical area that must be defended.

The people of Europe free from Soviet control number 300 million. They operate a great industrial plant, second only to our own. They occupy a uniquely strategic location. They are at once the most tempting prize for Soviet ambitions and our strongest allies in the world struggle for freedom.

The loss of Europe to the Soviet Union would not only be tragic in itself; it would also result in a tremendous shift of world power. It would compel us to convert the United States into an isolated garrison state.

That is why, 3 years ago, when the countries of Europe were trembling on the brink of economic collapse, the United States launched its program of aid for European recovery.

That is why, 2 years ago, the United States and Canada joined 10 Western European countries—Iceland, Great Britain, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Portugal, and Italy—in the North Atlantic Treaty, declaring that an attack on one would be considered an attack on all.

The North Atlantic Treaty reflects the basic fact of international life that the freedom of Western Europe and the freedom of North America are inseparable.

Under that Treaty, defense plans have been developed by the military leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty countries. Under General Eisenhower's central command, a unified army, navy, and air force is being organized for the defense of Western Europe, composed of national forces assigned by individual nations.

The key element in the defense of free Europe is the ability to hold on the ground. Western Europe lacks the insulation of wide oceans. Major preparations must therefore be made to hold its lands—by well-armed manpower on the ground, by the great striking force of airpower, and by a seapower which commands its surrounding waters and important lines of communication.

The European countries themselves are providing the great majority of the forces needed. The United States also has Army, Navy, and Air Force units in Europe, which add to the power of the combined defense forces, and more units will move there, both from this country and from Canada.

Our European partners in the North Atlantic Treaty now have over 2 million men under arms, plus large numbers of trained reserves. The bulk of Western Europe's armed forces are pledged

to General Eisenhower's command. Moreover, some of these countries—notably France and Britain—have sizable forces fighting in Malaya, Indochina, and Korea, and have other important overseas defense commitments. The combat power of Western European forces is rising steadily as equipment becomes available and periods of military service are lengthened.

Rearmament will cause a severe drain on the Western European countries. Through their own efforts, national and collective, and with the vital assistance of the Marshall Plan, Western Europe has made a remarkable record of economic recovery since 1947. Production and trade have been restored and financial conditions have been greatly improved. In the free countries of Europe, communism has been checked and thrown back. The original goals of the Marshall Plan have been largely achieved.

But the Western European countries are by no means yet free from the after effects of the most destructive war in history.

They are living on a very narrow economic margin. Whereas our standard of living is nearly 50 percent higher than it was before World War II, theirs has only recently reached their prewar levels, which were much lower than ours.

The European countries cannot move rapidly into sufficient large-scale military production to provide all the equipment required for the essential expansion of their forces. Over the next few years, they do expect to increase their production of military equipment. In the coming fiscal year, it will be more than double the pre-Korean rate. But the most they can do will not be enough to equip their armed forces on the time schedule necessary for the common defense.

The United States, with its huge and flexible industrial capacity and greater margin for diverting resources to military production, can and should continue to supply military equipment to our allies in Western Europe. In this way, many divisions, air squadrons, and naval vessels can be brought to active duty in the next year or two which otherwise can not be.

In the immediately coming years, the crucial need is to produce the initial equipment for a very rapid build-up of forces. The expanding European productive capacity will contribute increasingly to this build-up. With this capacity, Europe should be able to meet the smaller continuing maintenance and replacement requirements without substantial outside aid.

The military aid for Europe I am recommending amounts to 5.3 billion dollars. I also recommend economic assistance for this area for the coming year in the amount of 1.65 billion dollars.

Because of the degree of economic recovery which has been attained, the total economic assistance I am requesting for European countries next year—despite the large new burdens of European rearmament—is substantially reduced from



the amount we have provided in the current fiscal year.

However, in the free countries of Europe which are rearming, the proposed increases in military production and the building of armed forces will require large diversions of manpower and other economic resources away from production of goods for consumption, for investment, and for export. To carrying these greatly enlarged military burdens, our partners in Europe will be taking measures to increase taxes and mobilize their resources through economic controls. Despite determined efforts in this direction they will need some continuing economic assistance.

Some aid is also proposed for Western Germany, which by its support of occupation forces is assisting the defense effort and which may later make more direct contributions to the common defense. In Austria and Trieste, which cannot directly contribute to the rearmament effort, but whose economies are handicapped by special difficulties, economic aid must also be continued to maintain political stability. Certain economic assistance for Yugoslavia is proposed to help meet its minimum requirements in maintaining strength against the threat of Soviet imperialism.

This economic aid is critical—that is, it is the essential condition of an increase in European military effort. It should make possible European production many times larger than the amount of the support given.

#### MIDDLE EAST

The countries of the Middle East are, for the most part, less developed industrially than those of Europe. They are, nevertheless, of great importance to the security of the entire free world. This region is a vital link of land, sea, and air communications between Europe, Asia, and Africa. In the free nations of the Middle East, lie half of the oil reserves of the world.

No part of the world is more directly exposed to Soviet pressure. The Kremlin has lost no opportunity to stir these troubled waters, as the postwar record amply demonstrates. Civil war in Greece; pressure for Turkish concessions on the Dardanelles; sponsorship of the rebellious Tudeh party in Iran; furthering of factional strife in the Arab States and Israel—all reflect a concerted design for the extension of Soviet domination to this vital area.

There is no simple formula for increasing stability and security in the Middle East. With the help of American military and economic assistance, Soviet pressure has already been firmly resisted in Turkey and the Soviet-inspired guerrilla war has been decisively defeated in Greece. But the pressure against the Middle East is unrelenting. It can be overcome only by a continued build-up of armed defenses and the fostering of economic development. Only through such measures can these peoples advance toward stability

and improved living conditions, and be assured that their aims can best be achieved through strengthening their associations in the free world.

To these ends, I am recommending 415 million dollars in military aid, for Greece, Turkey, and Iran; a portion of this aid will be available for other Middle Eastern nations if necessary. I am also recommending 125 million dollars in economic aid for Middle Eastern countries, exclusive of Greece and Turkey for whom economic aid is provided as part of the program for Europe. This amount also includes programs of technical assistance to Libya, Liberia, and Ethiopia, three independent states of Africa whose economic problems are similar to those of the Middle Eastern countries.

Continuing military aid for Greece and Turkey will make possible the further strengthening of these countries' large and well-trained armed forces, which have already displayed their valiant resolution in the fight for freedom in Korea. In Iran, continuing military aid is required to help build internal security and defense, together with economic aid to help sustain the Iranian economy and give impetus to the much needed longer-term process of economic development for the benefit of the Iranian people.

In the Arab States and Israel, the fundamental requirement is a regional approach to the basic problems of economic development. This is urgently needed to reduce existing tensions, especially through the orderly settlement of homeless refugees. The program for the Arab States will expand needed food production through the development of land and water resources. The program for Israel will help that country to maintain her economy during an especially trying period of her national development. At the same time, the program of assistance to the Arab refugees from Palestine, which will necessarily extend beyond the coming fiscal year, has the threefold purpose of assisting the settlement of refugees, of strengthening those states wherein they settle, and assisting both Israel and the Arab States by removing this threat to the peace of the area.

The program I am now proposing is a balanced program for strengthening the security of the Middle East. It will make a solid contribution to our hopes for peace.

#### ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

In Asia, in a vast arc stretching from Afghanistan to Korea, free countries are struggling to meet Communist aggression in all its many forms. Some of these countries are battling the Communist armies of Soviet satellites; some are engaged in bitter civil strife against Communist-led guerrillas; all of them face the immediate danger of Communist subversion.

Soviet intentions with regard to these countries are unmistakably clear. Using the weapons of



subversion, false propaganda and civil war, the Kremlin has already reduced China to the status of a satellite. The Soviet rulers have turned their satellite armies loose on the Republic of Korea. Communist rebellion is raging in Indochina. In Burma, the Philippines, and other places, Communist-inspired groups are stirring up internal disorder. In all countries, they are trying to exploit deep-seated economic difficulties—poverty, illiteracy, and disease.

This campaign threatens to absorb the manpower and the vital resources of the East into the Soviet design of world conquest. It threatens to deprive the free nations of some of their most vitally needed raw materials. It threatens to turn more of the peaceful millions of the East into armies to be used as pawns at the disposal of the Kremlin.

Aside from immediate consideration of security, the continued independence of these nations is vital to the future of the free world. Many of these nations are new to self-government. They have dedicated themselves to the ideals of national independence, of human liberty, and social progress. Their hundreds of millions of citizens are eager for justice and liberty and a stake in the future.

These countries demonstrate the power and vitality of the ideals of our own American Revolution; they mark the sweeping advance across the world of the concepts of freedom and brotherhood. To lose these countries to the rulers of the Kremlin would be more than a blow to our military security and our economic life. It would be a terrible defeat for the ideals of freedom—with grave spiritual consequences for men everywhere who share our faith in freedom.

All these considerations make it essential for the United States to help the free countries of Asia in their struggle to make good their independence and bring economic and social progress to their people. Where the Governments of these countries are striving to establish free and stable political institutions, to build up their military defenses, and to raise the standard of living above the level of bare subsistence, we can and should give them assistance. We cannot replace their own strong efforts, but we can supplement them.

This Mutual Security Program is intended to do that. On the military side, it will supply certain of the Asian countries with items of military equipment and the training they need for their defense forces. On the economic side, it will provide a number of the Asian countries with the most urgently needed commodities, machinery, and tools, and with technical advice in such fields as agriculture, industry, health, and governmental administration.

The assistance I am recommending for Asian countries, 555 million dollars in military aid and 375 million dollars in economic aid, is so planned as to meet the most pressing needs in the various

countries, and is intended to provide the crucial margin of resources which will enable them to move forward.

Military assistance under this program will go to the Chinese armies on Formosa, to help keep that island out of the hands of Communist China. It will go to Indochina, where over 100,000 French troops are fighting side-by-side with the forces of Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia against Communist-led forces. It will go to the Philippines and to Thailand, to help build forces strong enough to insure internal security and discourage outside attack. Some of these military assistance funds will also be available for allocation to other countries in the area if a critical need arises.

The military aid under this program will supplement other military efforts against communism in Asia. The countries we will be aiding, and a number of others, are supporting military forces with their own funds. France is supplying the largest part of the military supplies needed in Indochina, and Britain is supplying her forces which are fighting guerrillas in the Malay States. The substantial military aid we are giving to the forces of the Republic of Korea is included in the budget for our military services.

The struggle for security and peace in Asia is far more than a military matter. In many of the Asian countries, including all the countries which need military aid, economic assistance is also required.

These countries urgently need help in their efforts to overcome the desperate conditions of poverty, illiteracy, and disease which are the heart of the Asian problem. It is a terrible fact that poverty is increasing rather than diminishing in much of Asia. Millions of people exist at bare subsistence levels.

The Asian countries are doing what they can on their own to meet this problem. An encouraging proposal affecting a number of these countries is the Colombo Plan for technical assistance and economic development worked out under the auspices of the British Commonwealth. In addition, some aid to Asian countries will be furnished through the programs of the United Nations.

These sources of aid alone will not, however, suffice to reverse the downward trend in living standards. Aid from the United States is also necessary.

Sizable programs of technical assistance and capital development are now being carried on by the Economic Cooperation Administration in some of these countries under the Point 4 concept. A portion of the funds I am now recommending will provide for continuing these programs and extending them to other countries. These funds will be used to send out technical experts and equipment needed to improve health, agriculture, transportation, and communications services and assist in the development of natural resources.

In addition, the funds I am now recommending

will provide necessary economic support for defense programs in Indochina, Formosa, and the Philippines.

Finally, the economic aid funds I am requesting for Asia include 112.5 million dollars for the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency. Together with 50 million dollars which are likely to remain unexpended from funds available for Korean aid for the present fiscal year, these funds will be made available to the Agency at such time as conditions in Korea permit the reconstruction program to be undertaken.

In preparing these recommendations for economic aid, projects which should be financed by loans have been excluded. The investment of private capital and public loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Export-Import Bank will play an important part in the economic progress of Asia, as in other parts of the world.

In the administration of this program, loans, grants, and technical assistance will be meshed together with the plans and efforts of each of the recipient countries for the development of its own resources. Only in this manner can the various kinds of outside aid available to an Asian country be used most effectively and without duplication or overlapping.

These economic programs will have as their goal the creation of conditions eliminating the need for further grant aid for economic development. Such programs look toward the creation of sound government finances and public services, and toward more stable economic and political foundations for raising living standards and creating broader opportunities. It will take time to reach these goals but they must be steadily pursued. Our aid will provide a dynamic force in that direction and will thus contribute strongly to freedom and peace in Asia.

#### **LATIN AMERICA**

The United States and the other American Republics agreed in 1947, in the treaty of Rio de Janeiro, that an armed attack upon one of them is to be regarded as an armed attack on all, and to act together for the common defense.

Our good neighbors to the south are more than willing to share in defending the hemisphere. But there are real limits on their ability to do so without some aid from us. They produce little modern military equipment.

During World War II, defense tasks in Latin America required the use of over 75,000 United States troops as well as considerable United States naval forces. The armed forces of the Latin American states did not at that time have the equipment or training to carry out those defense tasks by themselves.

It makes good sense that, in planning the defense of this hemisphere, the United States should aid the Latin American countries to prepare for and

take over certain hemisphere defense tasks that are of interest to us all; tasks they are willing to do and well able to handle, with a little help in equipping and training their forces. Consequently, I am recommending 40 million dollars in military assistance to these countries.

In addition, I recommend 22 million dollars in economic aid to carry forward the excellent technical assistance work that is now underway in the other American states in developing agriculture, natural resources, and health, education and other types of basic services. This type of assistance has already proved its worth in the Latin American area. It is helping to raise living standards, hasten economic development, and strengthen both peoples and Governments in warding off the danger of Communist subversion.

This grant assistance is helping to lay the foundation for an expanding volume of capital development, through public and private loans and investments, in the other American Republics. The United States is already providing major economic help to Latin American countries through loans by the Export-Import Bank. Fortunately, the relative geographic security and the economic position of the American Republics make possible large amounts of private loans and investments—the normal and desirable means of fostering economic development.

#### **Administration of the Program**

The proposed organization for administering the Mutual Security Program is based on the experience we have had so far, under the arrangements established by the Congress in legislation authorizing previous military and economic aid programs.

The administration of military aid will be handled, as at present, by the Department of Defense, which will be able to insure full coordination between United States production of equipment for our own forces and equipment for our allies. The Department of Defense is responsible for evaluating the equipment deficiencies of the forces of our allies, under mutually agreed strategic concepts, and is charged with procurement, inspection and transportation of military equipment provided by this country.

Administration of economic assistance for Western Europe and most of the countries in the Middle East, Africa, and South and Southeast Asia will be carried on by the Economic Cooperation Administration. This agency has already proved its effectiveness in aiding countries to achieve economic recovery and is now administering economic assistance in support of our mutual defense and security objectives in Europe and Southeast Asia. The economic aid programs for Latin America and certain other countries in which the economic aid is limited almost wholly to technical assistance are now administered by the Technical Coopera-



tion Administration of the State Department. Consideration is now being given to the question of whether or not it would be desirable to transfer the administration of these programs to the Economic Cooperation Administration during the period that that agency is administering other foreign economic aid programs.

These agencies will work very closely with the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in achieving a proper integration between loan and grant programs.

In order to insure coordinated policy guidance in administering military and economic aid programs, a key coordinating committee has been established composed of senior representatives of the executive agencies concerned. This International Security Affairs Committee has developed out of the experience of an executive committee that had previously been coordinating operations under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act. The chairman of the new committee, the Director of International Security Affairs, is a senior official of the Department of State confirmed by the Senate, and occupies a position authorized by the Congress under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act.

#### Conclusion

I recommend this Mutual Security Program to the Congress as another vital step along the road to real security and lasting peace. Peace through collective strength is a difficult course. It is not without danger. There can be no absolute assurance of success. But there are far greater dangers in any other course.

We cannot win peace through appeasement. We cannot gain security in isolation. We will not surrender.

Let it never be forgotten, however, that we are ready as we have always been, to follow the road of peaceful settlement of disputes, of control and reduction of armaments, of cooperation in applying man's talents to the building of a just and prosperous world society.

If the rulers of the Soviet Union did not drown their words of peace with the drums of war, if their professions of peaceful intent were matched by deeds, the century in which we live could become the brightest man has known upon this earth. For our part, if peace could be made sure, the American people would be glad to invest a part of the resources we must now allocate to defense to a large-scale program of world-wide economic development.

The benefits of such a program would be immense; the cost a small part of what we must now pay to build our defenses at home and abroad. With such a program, we could, in cooperation with other peoples, inaugurate the most hopeful and fruitful period of peaceful development the world has ever seen.

This was our vision 6 years ago, when the war came to a close. Let us never forget it. And let us never give up our hopes and our efforts to make it a reality.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
May 24, 1951

### Settlement of Intercustodial Conflicts Relating to Enemy Property<sup>1</sup>

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including the Trading With the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917 (50 U. S. C. 1 et seq.), as amended, and the act of September 28, 1950 (Public Law 857, 81st Congress), and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. The Secretary of State and the Attorney General are hereby jointly designated as the officers authorized to conclude and give effect to agreements relating to the settlement of intercustodial conflicts involving enemy property made pursuant to the said act of September 28, 1950, and to exercise all powers incident thereto which are conferred by such act, including, without limitation, the powers to receive, transfer, release, or return property, interests therein, or proceeds thereof.

2. It is the policy of this order that the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Attorney General, shall perform all functions necessary or appropriate to give effect to any agreement made pursuant to the said act of September 28, 1950, with relation to the protection of American interests in property outside the United States, and that the Attorney General, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, shall perform all functions necessary or appropriate to give effect to any such agreement with relation to property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and that all other functions relating to the effectuation of any such agreement shall be performed as may be agreed by the Secretary of State and the Attorney General. However, no action taken hereunder by either the Secretary of State or the Attorney General shall be considered to be invalid on the ground that under the provisions of this order such action was within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State rather than the Attorney General, or vice versa, or that concurrence was not obtained, or that such action was not joint.

3. The Secretary of State and the Attorney General may each delegate to the other or to any other officer, person, or agency within his respective department such of his functions under this order as he may deem necessary.

4. Any money, property, or interest received as reimbursement by the United States by virtue of any agreement made pursuant to the said act of September 28, 1950, shall be administered and disposed of by the Attorney General as vested property pursuant to the said Trading With the Enemy Act, as amended. Any other money, property, or interest received by the Secretary of State or the Attorney General pursuant to any such agreement shall be administered and disposed of pursuant to the provisions of such agreement.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
May 17, 1951.

<sup>1</sup> Ex. Or. 10244, 16 Fed. Reg. 4639.



## U.S. Position on British-Iranian Oil Controversy

### REMARKS BY SECRETARY ACHESON

[Released to the press on May 23]

*In response to questions regarding the United States position with respect to the Iranian oil controversy, Secretary of State Dean Acheson made the following extemporaneous remarks at his news conference today.*

As we pointed out in our statement of May 18, we believe very earnestly that the controversy between the British Government and the Iranian Government is a controversy which can be and should be settled by negotiation between those parties, and we indicated some of the principles which we thought were important in controlling the general conduct of those negotiations. I don't need to go over them again with you.

There has been comment in Iran, protest in Iran that the United States was intervening, or that we were hostile in some way to them. That is a very surprising reaction as far as I am concerned. I thought there was nothing having to do with intervention about it. There was nothing having to do with hostility or opposition to the stated desires of the Iranians in regard to the control of their resources.

We pointed out to them in the statement that we have consistently urged moderation on both the British and the Iranian Governments. We pointed out that we have taken a firm stand against unilateral action of a confiscatory nature. We pointed out the technical obstacles which the Iranian Government would face if it tried to remove the present company.

I hope that the Iranians will realize that the United States is their sincere friend, that it has helped them in the past and will in the future, and that the great and continuing interest of the United States in the independence, the territorial integrity, and the well-being of Iran remains a cardinal principle of American policy.

There is no intention by the United States of challenging Iran's sovereignty. A serious controversy exists, whatever the rights or wrongs of the matter may be. Such controversies cannot be settled unilaterally. The British Government has stated its willingness to negotiate and to make broad concessions to the Iranian point of view. The United States, therefore, publicly recorded its

belief that the two parties to the controversy should sit down at a conference table and work the matter out.<sup>1</sup>

As the statement pointed out, the United States is the friend of, and is deeply concerned in the welfare and strength of both parties to the controversy. The solution of the controversy is of great importance, both to the welfare and strength of these parties and of the entire free world, toward which the United States has made such great contribution. The statement voiced our deep and proper interest in such a solution.

Now, that is a reaffirmation of the reason for the statement, the propriety of the statement, and our interest in the peaceful settlement.

### TEXT OF AIDE-MÉMOIRE TO IRAN

*The following is the text of an aide-mémoire that the American Ambassador at Tehran handed to the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs on May 26.*

The aide-mémoire of His Excellency, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran, which was handed to the American Ambassador in Tehran on May 21, has been carefully considered by the Government of the United States.

It is unfortunate that the public statement made by this Government on May 18 has been misconstrued by the Iranian Government as intervention in the internal affairs of Iran.<sup>1</sup> The United States wishes to make it clear that it did not then intend, nor does it now intend, to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran, not to oppose Iran's sovereign rights or the expressed desires of the Iranian Government in regard to control of Iranian resources.

There is, however, legitimate basis for deep and proper interest on the part of this Government in a solution of the oil problem in Iran. A serious controversy exists between Iran and Great Britain, a controversy which could undermine the unity of the free world and seriously weaken it. The United States is bound to both countries by strong ties of friendship and has attested its sincere concern for the well-being of both. It has, therefore,

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of May 28, 1951, p. 851.

in view of the importance of the matter, discussed the issues with both parties and has stated publicly the principles it considers important in reaching a solution of this controversy.

The United States continues in its firm belief that an issue of this kind can be settled satisfactorily only by negotiation by the parties concerned. While the United States has urged upon both parties the need for moderation, it has taken no position on details of any arrangement which might be worked out. It has, however, reaffirmed its stand against unilateral cancellation of contractual relationships and actions of a confiscatory nature. The United States is convinced that

through negotiation a settlement can be found which will satisfy the desires of the Iranian people to control their own resources, which will protect legitimate British interests and which will assure uninterrupted flow of Iranian oil to its world markets. Such a settlement is, in the opinion of this Government, of the utmost importance not only to the welfare of the two powers concerned but to that of the entire free world. The United States wishes to state again its deep interest in the welfare of the Iranian people and in the maintenance of the independence and territorial integrity of Iran, which is a cardinal principal of United States policy.

## Tasks Confronting the Indian Government

by George C. McGhee

*Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, have existed as independent nations for less than 4 years. Independence came to India in consequence of a long and determined campaign against foreign domination. Indian leaders, accordingly, are wary of any form of external power—military, economic, political, or cultural—which might in any way threaten their independence. As a corollary, they are wary of too close an association with states which possess such power. The Indian Government adheres to the view that it may be able to steer a middle course and, by avoiding involvement in a global war, gain an opportunity to build up its economy and strengthen its political structure.

There is no question, however, as to what the Indian Government's reaction would be in the event that India were attacked. Indian spokesmen have stated that an invasion of Indian territory would be resisted with all the force at the country's disposal. Moreover, India's vigilance against invasion is not confined to its own borders. The Prime Minister has also made it clear that India will not tolerate an invasion of Nepal which, as you know, lies between India and Tibet. But India has also expressed its clear determination to avoid association with either of the so-called "blocs" in the cold war. The Indian Government favors the pursuit of peace not through alinement with any major power, but through an independent approach to each controversial issue.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpts from an address made before the Council on World Affairs at Cincinnati, Ohio, on May 15 and released to the press on the same date.

### Principal Problems

Let us now consider the principal problems which confront the Indian Government. India's leaders are committed to the task of strengthening the Governmental structure and improving the living conditions of its 350 million people. The Indian Government has had very little time to apply to this challenging task. It is disturbed by any development which threatens to interfere with its accomplishment. No threat causes the Indian leaders more concern than the threat of a global war. They are, therefore, doing everything within their power, according to their judgment and patterns of thought, to localize the present conflict and to prevent global war.

As leaders responsible for the destiny of a very young nation, their attitude might be expressed in the words of another prominent statesman, who said—

With me, a predominant motive has been to endeavor to gain time for our country to settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and to progress without interruption to that degree of strength and consistency which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own fortunes.

That statement by George Washington is even more cogent when we apply it to the masses of India's population, the great dislocations which India is undergoing as a result of the precipitate withdrawal of British authority and the pressure of the present times. With this background in mind—the strong desire of Indian leaders to let nothing interfere with the strengthening of their country—it is apparent why India is making every

effort to stay out of the so-called cold war and to avoid possible involvement in a shooting war should it come.

### Greater Voice in World Affairs

Another major motivation of Indian foreign policy lies in its desire for a greater voice for itself and the other Asian nations in world affairs, particularly in regard to those issues which directly relate to developments in Asia. Responsible Indian leaders tell us that their interest in establishing a greater voice in world affairs does not constitute an attempt to establish Indian leadership in Asia. Rather, they say, it represents an effort to impress the rest of the world with the fact that the awakening of Asia is a powerful factor in world affairs, that the decisive forces of history are no longer centered exclusively in the West.

In the words of the Indian Secretary General of External Affairs, India's advocacy of a greater voice for Asians in world affairs is—

A legitimate and timely reminder . . . that if new conflicts are not to arise under the impulse of political and economic discontent in the world's largest continent, the peoples of that continent must not be treated as dormant, dispirited, and helpless.

India's advocacy of greater Asian participation in international affairs is being realized not only at the United Nations but also within the Commonwealth and in India's direct relations with other members of the international community. Along with its South Asian neighbors, Pakistan and Afghanistan, India has played an increasingly important part in the councils of the United Nations. While more often than not India and the United States have voted on the same side in questions before the United Nations, we hold differing views on certain important issues, particularly the questions of Chinese Communist aggression in Korea, admission of Communist China to the United Nations, and the problem of Formosa.

Our differences with India appear, however, to be much more a matter of tactics than of basic goals. In the achievement of these goals, India is relying chiefly on moral suasion, we on collective security. As you are aware, the Indian Government has played a prominent part in efforts to find a basis for a peaceful settlement in Korea. Here, India and the United States have frankly differed on the best methods of achieving this end. We should not forget, however, that the ultimate goals of India and the United States are the same. Both Governments are working to limit hostilities in the Far East. Both are endeavoring to find a basis for lasting peace in the Far East and throughout the world. Our problem is to agree on the best means of attaining these ends.

Further, we are in full agreement with India concerning the desirability of giving the Asian peoples a greater voice in world affairs. We have a strong realization of the great forces at work in Asia today. No intelligent American will ques-

tion the desirability of closer consultation with the free Asian governments and of giving full consideration to their views in reaching our own decisions on important international questions. Support of the right of free Asian nations to participate in world councils is an effective means of achieving this end, and we have given that support, vigorously and without reservation. But we are not going to let any country—Asian or non-Asian—shoot its way into international councils, nor are we willing to extend membership therein as a reward for aggression.

Thus the differences which exist between the United States and the countries of South Asia are, I believe, more superficial than they appear to be. I should like, moreover, to describe some of the means through which we are endeavoring to resolve these differences and to broaden the significant areas of agreement which do in fact exist. In so doing, we must define the rock-bottom objectives on which our global foreign policy is based.

The basic principles of our foreign policy are to restore and maintain peace through collective action; to assist other peoples to establish the basis for stability and self-development, provided they desire our assistance and are themselves prepared to make the primary effort; and to work toward the development of better mutual understanding and cooperative effort between the free nations of the world.

### U.S. Objectives in This Area

Now, how are these principles being applied with respect to our relations with the South Asian countries, and with India in particular? As I have said, both the United States and India are dedicated to the objective of limiting aggression. The United States is attempting to do so through support of the United Nations military efforts to put down the aggression which is ravaging another Asian country. We know that we can make no compromise with the aggressive aims of international communism which serve as a cloak for Soviet imperialism.

We are, therefore, making every effort to convince the Indian Government of the rightness and logic of that course not only in the interests of collective defense by the international community but also in India's own self-interest. We are making every effort to demonstrate to the Indian people the relationship between the tactics of domestic Communist elements in India and the aggressive strategy of Soviet imperialism. At the same time, we are endeavoring to make clear to the South Asian people that we desire them to keep the significant gains which they have made in the direction of political independence and economic progress and to further consolidate those gains.

In our efforts to assist these Governments—all of which are non-Communist—to maintain their independence, we are faced with the problem of



letting the people of that area know that, however trying present conditions may be, Communist domination would create far greater misery. We are confronted with the task of demonstrating to the people of South Asia the need for resisting the false promises of the Communists if they would maintain their independence.

While we are, of course, careful to avoid interfering in any way in the internal affairs of these countries, we lose no opportunity to stress the vital importance of working toward the strengthening of their democratic processes and resisting any tendencies toward authoritarian rule. We try to make it abundantly clear to the peoples of South Asia that we respect their national independence and have no desire to engage in any sort of activity—political, military, or economic—which would interfere in their internal affairs.

Everyone recognizes that there are limits to the support we can give to the economies of other countries whose needs are so great. There are, however, steps which we can take to help improve living standards in free Asia which cost relatively little in terms of dollars—amounts which will be a good investment for us if they will help to build the economic, social, and political components of national strength. I have in mind, for example, technical assistance projects in which a single expert can teach thousands of farmers to improve crops and increase yields through simple demonstration of efficient methods of plowing, seed selection, and irrigation—processes which will help South Asians to move in the direction of self-sufficiency in food grains.

We supported India's request for loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, designed, in large part, to assist in the improvement of agricultural development. More recently, we have had an opportunity to demonstrate our interest in the economic development of this area by our participation on the Consultative Committee for Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia, which met in Ceylon in February. And we hope to accelerate and expand our technical assistance programs, to support projects worked out jointly with the Governments concerned. In the meantime, action is expected any day on the request by the President that Congress provide authority for furnishing 2 million tons of grain to India to avert the widespread famine that would result from the shortage of food production due to natural disasters.

As Gordon Gray emphasized, in his report to the President on foreign economic policies,

In a real sense, the newly established non-Communist governments of this region are on trial before their own people, with their status largely dependent upon their success in finding solutions to their economic problems, and in some areas to the agrarian problem in particular.

We are anxious to assist these free Governments in maintaining and improving their status and to demonstrate to their peoples that they are receiving constructive help in resolving their major problems.

#### **Effort To Maintain Friendly Relations**

In addition, we wish to make every effort to encourage the development of mutual understanding and to accommodate our thinking to that of our allies and friends, where we can do so without sacrificing our principles. In this task we can all plan an active role, as indeed the existence of your Council demonstrates.

I hardly need tell you that the day-to-day relations between American and South Asian officials are frank and friendly. They constitute a sound basis for continuing efforts to narrow down our differences in approach. Moreover, the increasing interchange of persons between the United States and South Asia—exchanges of students and teachers, of professional and technical people—is steadily demonstrating and consolidating the mutuality of our interests. This is a process which has an important cumulative effect.

But it is also of vital importance that we demonstrate, both as a nation and as private citizens, that we are deeply interested in the welfare of the South Asian people, that we understand their aspirations, and that we are making sacrifices to preserve the independence of the world's free nations, including the independence of South Asia.

In conclusion, we must not forget that all the Governments of South Asia have thus far successfully resisted the efforts of Communist agents and parties to challenge their authority. In the light of reports of neutral attitudes in these countries toward the Far Eastern crisis, we must not forget that they are fiercely proud of their independence, that they are ready to defend it to the very limit of their ability. We must not lose sight of the fact that there is no single government in South Asia which would willingly accept any arrangement or compromise with any foreign power if it were apparent that this would endanger its hard-won independence.

Let us, then, take hope from the all-important fact that South Asia and its half billion people remain an integral part of the free world. We hope, ultimately, to see the voluntary and forthright association of South Asia in collective action for freedom. On this hope, we can build for the future of Asia.

#### **Appointment of Officers**

Robert G. Barnes as Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat, effective May 21, 1951.

## A Global Foreign Policy

by Francis H. Russell  
*Director, Office of Public Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

It has been natural, in fact inevitable, that the working people of this country should be among the first to discern the real nature of the primary problem of our time, world communism. They were among the very first to be the object of attack in the peculiar ways in which communism tries to achieve its objectives, by propaganda and confusion. The way in which labor in this country has met that attack and then taken the leadership in helping to resist it around the world stands in the forefront of the successes of democracy. Most dramatic are the successes achieved in Korea, in Italy, Greece, Turkey, in Berlin, and on other fronts.

It is of great importance for this country not only to have strong diplomatic and political ties with other countries but also to have increasingly close relationships between our working people and workers in other countries. In today's struggle, there is no substitute for the good that can be done by a close bond between American labor unions and people elsewhere who are attempting to move forward to greater freedoms and higher standards of living.

### Debate on our Foreign Policy

Our foreign policies are today the subject of a great national debate.

It is becoming clear that this great debate involves three basic issues. First is an issue of facts. What is the nature of the crisis we face? What kind of an enemy confronts us? What are his methods, his intentions, his potential? What are our sources of strength? How strong and how reliable are our allies?

The second issue is an issue of principles and objectives. What kind of a world do we hope to see established? Is it a world dominated by the

United States? Or is it a world based upon cooperative arrangements among free peoples? Do we want a world of expanding trade with increased opportunity for all people? Or do we want a world with each country for itself, a world that would be without hope for the submerged two-thirds of the world's population?

The third issue is an issue of methods for achieving our objectives. Can we achieve these objectives by pulling back behind a "gibraltar of the Western Hemisphere?" Can we achieve them by "going it alone?" Or should we work through the various instruments of international cooperation? Should we take any chance of bringing on World War III that could possibly be avoided? Or should we direct all our efforts to achieving freedom with peace.

If we can thwart the efforts to confuse us, if we strip off the irrelevant, we will find that these are the problems that we must tackle.

### The Issues To Be Considered

Let us consider each of these issues briefly.

First, what is the nature of the enemy we face? We cannot know how to deal with him until we know who and what he is. There are those who insist on waging today's struggle in terms of the wars of the past. But this is not just a power struggle between two nations. If this were merely a conflict between the United States and China, there might be every reason why we should use all of our resources to push forward to a speedy victory over the Peiping regime. But China is not our principal enemy. We could pay the enormous price of victory in a war against China, and find ourselves, weakened and our resources depleted, still faced with the real enemy.

Nor is our enemy just a political or economic system. We believe profoundly in the right of all men to political freedom and economic well-being. We are not engaged in trying either to resist, or to establish over other peoples, a particular political or economic system. On the contrary, we believe

<sup>1</sup> Excerpts from an address made before the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks Convention at San Francisco, Calif., on May 19 and released to the press on the same date.

that every country, every people, has the right to its own political and economic institutions, even though we may not like some of them.

Today's crisis has arisen because a number of long term, world-wide developments, each of which presents problems of vast proportions, have fused at this particular point in history to produce one of the greatest crises in the history of civilization.

What are these developments? Let me mention some of them.

The first is an international conspiracy directed by one imperialist power. Communism as a world movement is almost exactly a century old but only within the last few years as a result of its having been forged into a principal instrument of Soviet Russia has it constituted the threat to the progress of civilization which it is today.

It has been with difficulty that some Americans have come to a realization of the nature and extent of this threat. There has been nothing in our life to prepare most Americans to understand the designs and the amoral workings of the minds of the men in the Kremlin. But we have come to know that basically they take their departure from most of the rest of mankind at the point where they adopt and build upon the concept that the ultimate value, the final objective in life is the exalting of an entity, the "party." The interests of the party, the Communists say, transcend all rights and interests of individual human beings. Human beings are only pawns to be sacrificed to this end.

From this basic philosophy, the Communists are led inexorably to a controlled press and radio, to purges in place of elections, to a police state where every person is required to be a spy on friend and family, to slave camps, police cards which control movement from one place to another, state monopolies controlling all aspects of economic life, dictated employment, and the banning of freedoms of the mind, of speech, and of religion. All of these are the inevitable attributes of a political system that glorifies the state.

Add to this their fanatical belief that all adherents to the movement must do everything possible to impose this pattern of human existence upon the two and a half billion people in the world. In achieving this there are no moral curbs. They play upon the fears and hopes, the resentments and the ambitions of different groups of people. They say one thing to one person, another thing to other people. They strike terror in the hearts of people wherever they can. They attempt to frustrate all kinds of organizations, from labor unions to the United Nations itself. They create planned chaos and exploit want so people will give up in despair and follow anyone who promises them anything at all. They use aggression where they believe that it will accomplish their purpose. The handful of men in the Kremlin are, in simple fact, engaged in a conspiracy, and they operate through a tight party mechanism

that has its representatives in every part of the world.

It is their ambition to eliminate all other kinds of human existence. They are not interested in compromise. They are not interested in negotiation except as it may give them some kind of tactical or propaganda advantage. That has been demonstrated time and time again. There is only one thing that will give them any halt, even for a moment, and that is the prospect that they may wind up worse off, possibly even with a complete loss of power. That they are not prepared to risk.

That is the nature of the men we face.

#### **Reasons for the Korean Attack**

Now, there are a number of conclusions that follow from such an understanding of our enemy. First, it makes clear what the situation is that confronts us in Korea.

The Soviet Union is continuously and relentlessly engaged in searching out weak spots everywhere in the world and then bringing its resources to bear to exploit them to their own ends. Last June, there were numerous buttons that the Kremlin could have pushed. They could have pushed a button that would have started trouble in Germany, or another against Yugoslavia, or in Iran, or they could have stepped up the pressure against Indochina.

The place they chose for their greatest effort was Korea. They chose Korea for several reasons. Intrinsically, from the point of view of raw materials and industrial output, Korea was perhaps the least important. Perhaps the Kremlin felt that the free world might be less inclined to rally to its support. Korea was divided and this gave the Kremlin a chance to claim that it was merely a civil war. But if the aggression succeeded, the Kremlin would be in a position to threaten Japan, one of its major objectives in the Far East.

The obstructions which have been put in the way of a Japanese peace treaty by the Soviet Union are significant. Moreover, the Republic of Korea constitutes a special commitment of the United Nations and the wiping out of the Republic of Korea would have been a serious blow, perhaps a mortal blow, to the prestige and integrity of the United Nations.

But the important thing about Korea is that it was only one of many points at which the aggressor could have directed his blow. It was a test that was being watched by all of the other countries on the perimeter of the Soviet orbit. If Korea were allowed to fall, other friends of freedom would have felt their case was hopeless. We would have faced the possibility of free governments starting to fall like dominoes. All of these things are at stake today in Korea.

It also follows from this analysis of the nature of communism that we shall get nowhere with



proposals for buying off the Kremlin. They will be unimpressed by suggestions that this country, for example, devote to world-wide constructive purposes 10, 20 or 50 billion dollars during the next 5 years provided the Kremlin calls off its aggressive designs. They will be unmoved by proposals for world government as a means for dealing with present tensions and conflicts. The world, to be sure, must strengthen its institutions for security and well-being. But the men in the Kremlin have no interest in promoting that. They have their own very precise pattern of world government and are impressed not by argument, but by power.

An understanding of the basic nature of Soviet communism also makes it possible for us to deal with their efforts to confuse and divide by all-out propaganda. Last year, the Cominform set out to get 400 million signatures to its Stockholm appeal. It was apparent that this was merely an attempt by the Kremlin to exploit the universal desire for peace and to place the onus for the international tensions, which the Kremlin itself has created on the free world.

#### **The "Peace Crusade" Objective**

This year, the Cominform is engaged in another effort to confuse and divide the people of the non-Communist world, through a "peace crusade." The objectives of this "crusade" turn out to be the political and military objectives of the Kremlin, namely: (1) to get the United Nations out of Korea so that the Communists can succeed in their aggression there, (2) to bring about the recognition of the Chinese Communist regime under conditions that would solidify the dominance of the Kremlin over China, (3) to bring about a cessation or weakening of the effort to build the defenses of Western Europe under General Eisenhower, (4) to prevent the creation of a free and independent Western Germany, so that this greatest concentration of industrial power outside the United States can be taken over by the Soviet Union, and (5) once more to attempt to sidetrack efforts at genuine disarmament in all types of weapons and to marshal public opinion for a scheme which would deny defensive strength to the free world while leaving untouched the massive military machine of the Soviets.

#### **Purpose of Soviet Propaganda**

Now, all of these are points on which intelligent, sincere, and patriotic people of the free world hold different views. A few months ago, according to Mr. Gallup, considerably more than half of the American people felt that we should pull our boys out of Korea. That did not mean that half of the American people were Communists. (Today, the great majority of Americans are in favor of seeing it through in Korea.)

Many of our strongest allies hold views that differ from ours with respect to the way of dealing with Communist China. That does not mean that they are Communists. A number of prominent Americans are opposed to American participation in the defense of Western Europe. They are not Communists.

But the purpose of Soviet propaganda is to accentuate these differences of opinion, to use them to create doubt, confusion, and suspicion, to drive a wedge between free peoples, to prevent the solidarity upon which the strength of the free nations must be built. And so it is that when we go beyond honest discussion and debate and wander in what may, at times, appear to be the attractive fields of narrow partisanship, character assassination, and public confusion we are opening up the only way by which the Communists can hope to make any real headway against us. The leaders in the Kremlin are bending every effort to make the free world as disunited as possible. Their spirits rise according to the intensity with which we feud among ourselves and attack our own. When we do that we are doing their work for them.

So the first factor in the present world crisis is the threat of Soviet Communist imperialism. The second is the revolutionary mood and ferment, entirely unrelated to the Soviet will to world domination, that characterizes the minds of two-thirds of the world's people, the people whose annual income averages around a hundred dollars a year, whose average life span is 30 years, less than one half that of our own, for example. They are the billion and a half people who, only within recent years, have learned through moving pictures, radio, newspapers, and personal contact with the peoples of the economically more fortunate countries that the application of modern science and technology to the resources of their areas of the world can produce a vastly increased standard of living for them and their families. They feel they have hold of the short end of the stick, and they are determined by one means or another to redress that situation. It is this widespread discontent that has been exploited by the Chinese Communists.

#### **China, a Lesson to the Free World**

A revolution has been going on in Asia over a long time. It is an economic revolution and a political and ideological revolution, revulsion against misery and poverty and revulsion against foreign domination. It is an insistent drive to individual betterment and national independence. We must base our policies upon a recognition of the power of those dynamic forces.

China is a lesson, a most bitter lesson, to the depressed peoples of the world of what happens when the Communist sword conquers a country and the bright promises all turn out to be false. The families of China are suffering today in

frightful numbers the losses that come when Communist leaders take over and use the subjected peoples as pawns in their further quest for power. The people of China and other satellites are in the process of absorbing this lesson.

But the free world, too, must learn the lesson of our time. We must understand the mood of change and revolution among the hundreds of millions of the world's depressed peoples. We must meet the Communist challenge not only when it takes the form of overt aggression but in the struggle for the minds of men. We must do this through the Campaign of Truth with the instruments at our disposal such as the Voice of America, libraries, exchange of persons programs, and the other ways that are available to us. We must do it also by demonstrating in fact that we can deal with such problems as land reform, racial differences, conditions of labor, standards of living, more effectively under free institutions than can ever be accomplished under totalitarian regimes.

#### **Answers to Communist Aggression**

Your Union can be proud of the role taken by the president of your organization in the founding conference of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). Free national trade unions such as yours, as well as the ICFTU and other international groups, like the International Transport Workers' Federation, are among the most effective answers to Communist attempts to confuse and control the minds of men.

In another area, take the question of land, or agrarian reform, as it is sometimes called. Despite loose assertions to the contrary, no responsible American official has asserted that the Chinese Communists were "mere agrarian reformers." It has been clear from the beginning that they were Stalinist Communists in thought and in fact. But we shall seriously miscalculate, as others have miscalculated in the past, if we fail to understand the importance of the Chinese Communist propaganda promising agrarian reform to the peasants of China. The average Asian farmer, like the average American farmer, looks forward to land of his own.

One of the most important measures that has been carried out in Japan since the occupation is that of land reform. Today, in Japan, only 10 percent of the farmers are tenants. Before the war, half of them were. By contrast in North Korea, there is a virtually universal resentment against the trickery that has taken place in the guise of "land reform" under the Communists.

In contrast to the fate of the North Korean and the Chinese people, many of the submerged peoples of the world have recently achieved the freedom and national independence for which they have striven for generations. As recently as within the last 5 or 10 years India, Pakistan,

Ceylon, Burma, the associated states of Indochina, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Korea have emerged as full-fledged members of the community of nations. It would be a supreme irony, a frightful tragedy if, as a result of a time lag in thinking, a carry-over of old resentments, those hundreds of millions of people were to throw themselves into a slavery that would be infinitely harsher than they have known in the past, that is, into the slavery of the Kremlin.

We must make sure that we do not put ourselves in a position of successfully keeping communism from entering the front door through resisting its aggression, while it comes through the back door—in the minds of hundreds of millions of the world's people who are trying to improve their lot. Fortunately, there is no country in the world that can help these people achieve what they are striving for as we can, and have, through the Marshall Plan, Export-Import Bank loans, and Point 4. We must continue to use our great economic strength to build more strength in the free world.

Closely akin to this revolutionary ferment is the third major element, the accumulation of years of racial bitternesses and hatreds. The representative of the Chinese Communists, in his 2-hour outburst before the Security Council of the United Nations last January, gave evidence of the volcanic fury that is smoldering among many of the colored races of the world. The demands of "Asia for the Asiatics," the morbid preoccupation of the press of India with racial problems here in the United States, the relations between the races in various parts of Africa, are all instances of the intensity of this problem.

Anyone who asserts that he has the answers to this problem is only displaying the extent of his own ignorance. It is infinitely difficult and infinitely complex. But anyone who, because of its complexity, turns his back on the problem is taking the path to disaster. It will remain with us long after the Communist threat has disappeared.

As a fourth major element in our current world crisis, I would mention the moral and material disintegration that is still our heritage from World War II. Many, but by no means all, of the homes and factories that were bombed in the last war have been rebuilt, but the people of Europe are still suffering from the effects of the war, of occupation, of malnutrition, and want. The fears, the apprehensions, the absence of willingness to face facts are just as real, and frequently more difficult to deal with than was the concrete devastation of the war. We cannot deal with them by mere gestures of impatience.

Finally, in spite of the progress that we have made in building the fabric of international cooperation through the United Nations, the North Atlantic Council, the Organization of American States, and other international instruments, we

still have national fears, national prides, national ambitions, national hatreds, that make it difficult to construct a firm and lasting peace, as we have found in our efforts to further the integration of Western Europe.

These are the main elements of the present crisis of freedom and democracy.

Now, if this is the real nature of our problem, it follows that there has been, there is, and there will be no magic wand that someone could wave, no magic phrase that someone could utter to make the problem disappear. The ingredients of our crisis go far back into the past. They will extend into the future for years to come. And it will require the utmost in human understanding, patience, determination, and sacrifice if we are to overcome them.

These are the facts of world life, and unless we always bear them in mind, we shall risk the danger of making false moves and dissipating our resources.

### **Our Long-Range Objective**

Now, faced with this kind of situation, what should be the objectives to guide us in our day-to-day operations?

Our major, overriding objective is to make it possible for the world to move forward, gradually if necessary but steadily, with the task of creating greater freedoms, better living conditions, a progressively happier existence for the people of the world. This is our long-range objective, because only in such a world can the people of the United States hope to maintain their way of life.

We know that this country cannot "go it alone" because, if we go it alone and all other countries go it alone, we shall be turning the world over to aggressors, and the rest of the world will be very quickly arrayed against us.

We want a world in which neither the Soviet Union nor we nor any other power is going to dictate how things shall be.

We want a world at peace.

How do we hope to accomplish these broad objectives?

First, we must deal with the outright aggression that has been launched in Korea against the free world, the first aggression by mass armies across a national line since the United Nations was set up.

We are fighting in Korea to demonstrate the integrity and efficacy of the United Nations in resisting aggression so that it will not follow the dismal path that was taken by the countries of the world under the League of Nations.

We are fighting to give courage and confidence to other nations that are on the periphery of the Soviet orbit, to show them they are not standing alone and that they may safely take measures to resist Soviet threats.

We are fighting to give time for the free world to build up its vast potential strength.

It has been said that the object of war is victory—no more and no less—and in the present world context that means victory over China. But we must keep our eyes on the main objective, and real victory may require much less than complete subjugation of another country.

At least three times in our history, we have fought major wars in which we achieved our objectives without conquering the nations with which we fought.

In 1798, we fought a naval war with France to protect our commerce and shipping. We won that struggle but we did not carry the war to France. Secretary of State Timothy Pickens, who had insisted on an all-out war against France, was dismissed by President Adams.

In the War of 1812, a satisfactory settlement was achieved with the British by negotiation.

In the Spanish-American War, our purpose was limited. We did not carry the war against Spain itself but we did achieve our limited political objective, to free the Cuban people from the oppression of Spanish rule.

In each case, we achieved a limited objective without extending the warfare.

Always, in times of national crisis, the American people have had to contend with defeatists, with those who said that victory was impossible. Washington had them on his hands at Valley Forge. Lincoln had to contend with them all during the Civil War right up to the moment of victory. More recently, there were those who said that the airlift to Berlin could not win out, and others who contended that aid to Greece and Turkey was fruitless and without hope of any successful end.

### **The Danger of Defeatism**

Today, the greatest danger that we face is the danger of defeatism. Defeatism may show itself in two ways. There is the defeatism of despair and the defeatism of desperation.

We must guard against those who say that our situation is hopeless and that there is no good in making the effort.

We must guard equally against those who say that, because we are faced with difficulties, we should resort to desperate measures.

There is no cause for either despair or desperation. We have every reason for confidence.

We are in the process of building military power capable of meeting with overpowering strength any further Communist aggression. We have the ingredients of this power.

Today, the Soviet rulers and their puppets dominate the destiny of 800 million people. This is their greatest potential strength. But two-thirds of the world's population live in countries still masters of their own destiny and not subject to domination from the Kremlin.



Moreover, the 150 million of the United States and the 275 million of free Europe are the highest skilled, the most productive in the world. The trained minds and trained hands of free men working through free institutions give the free world a productive capacity that far overtops anything the police state and slave labor can produce both in peace and in war.

Steel production is on the side of the free world. Last year, American labor and business management produced 96 million short tons of crude steel. Free Europe produced 55 million tons, Russia and its European satellites produced only 34 million tons.

In 1950, the United States and free Europe produced over a billion tons of coal. Russia and its satellites produced 290 million.

The United States and Western Europe produced 625 billion kilowatt hours of electric energy. Russia and its satellites only 125 billion.

Over the last 10 years, the average standard of living in this country has increased by 30 percent. This increase is equal to the total national production of the Soviet Union—just our advance during the past 10 years.

During the last war, we reached the point where 45 percent of all of our production went into war materials. It is estimated that the percentage of our production during the next 2 years may reach as high as 20 percent. Some of that, of course, will come out of continued increases in production; some of it will have to come out of our standard of living, but probably not by more than 5 percent.

In the last quarter of 1950 in the United States, our industrial production was 22 percent above the level of the previous year. In Western Europe, the industrial production was 23 percent above the level in 1949. This step-up in industrial production, of course, requires many more raw materials and that is what has given rise to some of the shortages that we face, some of the sacrifices that consumers are called upon to make.

In other less developed parts of the free world, there is tremendous additional economic strength, much of it still only a potential. Yet last year, it contributed a large part of the 9 million barrels of crude oil produced daily by the free world. The Soviet Union and its satellites produced less than 1 million.

The free world and largely the underdeveloped nations produced 90 percent of the world's total output of natural rubber, two-thirds of its tin and by far its greatest quantities of uranium, copper, and other essential raw materials.

To mobilize fully the vast actual and potential productive capacity of the free world, the President in his budget message revealed that the

United States proposes to spend over the next year more than 9 billion dollars. We are proposing to use that money to provide arms and other military equipment to areas in the free world where it is most needed. We are proposing to spend part of it in helping other industrial countries in getting their own military production rolling full blast. We propose to spend part of it in supplying essential goods of a nonmilitary kind to countries whose economies are likely to fall without our help. And we propose to spend part of it in technical cooperation programs with other nations to help them help themselves.

The sum total of this program is the building of mutual strength to the point where the Kremlin either will not dare to attack or will be defeated decisively if it does.

Now, no one can give any guarantee that we can avoid a general war because the leaders of the Communist conspiracy can launch a war if they decide to. But, if one should come, we must be in the strongest possible position to meet it, both in our military strength and in our moral position throughout the world.

#### **Summarizing Our Foreign Policy**

What, then, is our foreign policy?

It is to advance the welfare and preserve the safety of the United States by putting the weight of the United States behind the steady advance of mankind toward freedom and a better life.

It is to resist the greatest threat to this advance, the aggression of Soviet communism and to cooperate with other free peoples in meeting this threat.

It is to demonstrate in Korea, where Communist aggression has shown itself in its barest and most threatening form, that aggression will not and cannot succeed and that free people everywhere will be supported in their efforts to resist it.

It is to build up the strength of the free world as rapidly as possible to a point where it cannot be challenged and to do it in such a way as to avoid the frightfulness of world war.

It is to demonstrate that the real revolution is the revolution of freedom; that the ultimate value is not a party or a regime, but human life, human beings; that society must be concerned with providing the environment of freedom in which the individual's "happiness," as we put it in our Declaration of Independence, can best take place: freedom to believe, to worship, to speak, to read, to move from one community to another, to create, to freely choose political and economic institutions.

These are the things that mark the real world revolution.

This is the cause we serve, with the steady confidence of people who serve the right.

## Communiqué on Settlement of German External Debts

[Released to the press May 24]

*The following announcement was made today:*

The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States have been considering the problem of bringing about a settlement of German debts as envisaged by the agreement of 6th March with the German Federal Government. They have now transmitted to the Government of the German Federal Republic and to the Governments of a number of interested countries a communication which describes a proposed procedure for arriving at a settlement of Germany's prewar debts and which outlines their present views on the points of principle relating to it. A copy of this communication, together with its several enclosures, is being released simultaneously, and is attached herewith.

It is proposed that a meeting of interested parties, both governmental and private, should be held in London in the autumn of this year. To prepare for this meeting and to represent their interests in the discussions of the German debt problem, the three Governments have established a Tripartite Commission on German Debts. The Commission will also represent their interests in regard to the question of Germany's debts arising from the postwar economic assistance which the three Governments have extended to Germany.

The Tripartite Commission on German Debts will carry on the work on German debts hitherto performed by the Intergovernmental Study Group on Germany, which has now completed the various other tasks assigned to it by the three Governments.

Attachments are as follows:

### COMMUNICATION CONCERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF GERMAN EXTERNAL DEBTS

1. The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States have reached the conclusion in agreement with the German Federal Government that the settlement of German external debts is in the interests of the restoration of normal economic and financial relations between

Germany and other countries. They have also agreed with the German Federal Government that interested Governments, including the Federal Republic, creditors and debtors, shall participate in working out a subsequent plan in accordance with certain principles.

2. The exchange of letters which placed this agreement on record, and the letter from the Allied High Commission to the German Federal Chancellor which preceded it and which set out the views of the three Governments in regard to the settlement of claims against Germany, were published on 6th March. Copies of these letters are attached as Enclosure 1.

3. As recorded in this exchange of letters of 6th March, the three Governments have been engaged in preparing proposals for the working out of arrangements for an orderly overall settlement which would be fair and equitable to all the interests affected. They have now completed a tentative procedure for arriving at acceptable settlement arrangements, a statement outlining their present views on points of principle relating to the settlement, and a list of certain technical questions requiring consideration. The relevant documents, of which copies are attached as Enclosures 2, 3, and 4, are intended to serve as a preliminary basis for consultations later in the year. In order to prepare for these consultations the three Governments intend to hold informal preliminary meetings in order to obtain views of some of the interested parties. Thereafter further communications will be sent on the subjects of the enclosures listed above and arrangements made for the participation in these consultations of representatives of creditors and debtors, of the German Federal Government and of the Governments of countries having a significant creditor interest.

4. The three Governments, in order to make an overall settlement of German debts possible, are prepared to modify the priority of their claims in respect of the postwar economic assistance which they furnished to Germany, on condition that the settlement plan is acceptable to them.

5. The arrangements contemplated relate to

Germany's prewar public and private indebtedness and to the German debt arising out of postwar economic assistance; they do not relate to claims arising out of the war which can only be dealt with in connection with a peace treaty.

6. The three Governments have set up a Tripartite Commission on German Debts to act on their behalf in the necessary consultations and negotiations. A copy of its terms of reference is attached as Enclosure 5.

#### Enclosure 1

##### A. LETTER TO FEDERAL CHANCELLOR OF OCTOBER 23, 1950

TO: His Excellency, The Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

MR. CHANCELLOR, I have the honour to refer to the communiqué issued by the Foreign Ministers in New York in which they indicated that the Federal Government would be expected to undertake certain commitments consonant with the new responsibilities which the Governments of the three Occupying Powers contemplated would be conferred upon the Federal Republic. The three Governments hold that, at the moment when the Federal Government assumes responsibility for the conduct of its foreign relations, the status of the obligations resting upon it in its relations with foreign countries should be clarified. The three Governments regard the Federal Government as the only German Government which can speak for Germany and represent the German people in international affairs pending the reunification of Germany. They consider, therefore, that pending a final peace settlement, and without prejudice to its terms, the Federal Government is the only Government entitled to assume the rights and fulfil the obligations of the former German Reich.

The High Commission has communicated to the Federal Government separately the decisions which have been taken by the Foreign Ministers concerning the clarification of the status of treaties to which the German Reich was a party. The question of the obligations of the Reich also involves the external debt of the Reich. The three Governments consider that the Federal Government should in consonance with what has been said above, assume responsibility for the prewar external debt of the Reich. They recognize that, in the determination of the manner in which and the extent to which the Federal Government is to fulfil the obligations arising from this assumption, account must be taken of the general situation of the Federal Republic, including, in particular, the effect of the limitations on its territorial jurisdiction.

The determination of the financial responsibilities of the Federal Government necessarily also involves the obligations resulting from the economic assistance which has been furnished by the occupying powers to Germany. As the Federal Government is aware, the occupying powers have, at considerable cost to the peoples of their own countries, extended substantial economic assistance to Germany since the termination of hostilities, with a view to ensuring the well-being of the German people and assisting them in the rehabilitation of their economic life. In due course the occupying powers will call for a settlement of the obligations arising from this assistance. They will consider in the settlement of these obligations the ability of the Federal Government to pay and other relevant factors. Meanwhile, they consider that the Federal Government should acknowledge its debt in respect of the expenditures which they have incurred and that it should recognize the prior status of these obligations over other claims.

It is the intention of the three Governments to proceed as promptly as possible with the development of a settlement plan which will assure fair and equitable treatment

#### John W. Gunter Named to Tripartite Commission on German Debts

The Department of State today announced on May 25 the appointment of John W. Gunter as the United States alternate representative on the Tripartite Commission on German Debts.

Mr. Gunter, who has been the United States member of the Greek Currency Committee in Athens since 1949, will have the personal rank of Minister. He already has arrived in London to assume his new duties on the debt-commission.

of the interests affected and remove as far as practicable obstacles to normal economic relations between the Federal Republic and other countries. These arrangements would necessarily be provisional and subject to revision when Germany is reunited and a final peace settlement becomes possible. The three Governments are agreed that the plan should provide for the orderly settlement of the claims against Germany, the total effect of which should not dislocate the German economy through undesirable effects on the internal financial situation, nor unduly drain existing or potential German foreign exchange resources. It should also avoid adding appreciably to the financial burden of any Occupying Power.

The three Governments have instructed the Intergovernmental Study Group on Germany in London to prepare a plan for handling claims in accordance with the above principles and to recommend arrangements for the appropriate participation of other interested Governments and the debtors and creditors, including the Federal Government. The Federal Government will in due course be informed of the results of these studies.

Although there are numerous problems to which it has not yet been possible to give consideration, the three Governments are in agreement that the settlement plan should include, in particular, those categories of claims whose settlement would best achieve the objective of normalising the economic and financial relations of the Federal Republic with other countries. In their view the plan must therefore necessarily deal with the prewar external debt as well as with the claims in respect of postwar economic assistance which enjoy a priority status over all other claims. The plan should also provide for the settlement of certain claims in connection with social insurance operations and with the conversion into deutschemark of reichsmark brought back from Germany by repatriated prisoners of war and deportees, if these claims have not been disposed of before the establishment of the plan.

In addition to the foregoing matters, other questions may arise in the detailed working out of the settlement arrangements. For example, it may be necessary to give consideration to certain prewar debts owed to the residents of foreign countries which may not be strictly classifiable as external in character.

The three Governments recognize that a settlement plan of the scope envisaged can be put into effect only through some modification of the priority of their claims in respect of postwar economic assistance. Accordingly, the three Governments have agreed that, provided a settlement plan is worked out in accordance with the principles outlined in the preceding paragraphs and provided further that agreed procedures and controls are established that will govern this settlement plan and all payments made under it, they will modify the priority of their claims in respect of postwar economic assistance to the extent necessary to permit the fulfillment of such an agreed plan. This qualified modification of the priority of claims in respect of postwar economic assistance will not preclude the continued fulfillment of the obligations which the Federal Government has already incurred under existing agreements concerning such claims.

The three Governments feel certain that the Federal Government shares their views as to the desirability of



restoring Germany's credit and of providing for an orderly settlement of German debts which will ensure fair treatment to all concerned, taking full account of Germany's economic problems. They feel equally certain that the Federal Government will share their belief that such a settlement will contribute to the restoration of normal relations between Germany and other countries.

The three Governments would appreciate receiving a formal assurance from the Federal Government that it regards itself as responsible for the prewar external debt of the German Reich and that it recognizes its debt with respect to the expenditures incurred by the occupying powers for economic assistance to the Federal Republic and affirms the priority of the claims arising from such assistance over other claims against Germany. They would also appreciate receiving assurances of the cooperation of the Federal Government in working out and implementing a settlement plan.

In order to give formal effect to these undertakings and assurances and to the undertakings and assurances offered by the Governments of the three occupying powers, I have to propose that an agreement should be concluded by an exchange of notes between the Allied High Commission and the Federal Government. It is the intention of the High Commission to proceed with the modification of the controls in the Occupation Statute on the lines agreed by the three Foreign Ministers as soon as this exchange of notes is completed and the assurance in respect of cooperation in an equitable apportionment of materials and products in short supply required for common defense, on which a separate letter is today being sent to you, has been received. However, it is the understanding of the three Governments that the exchange of notes on debt obligations will be submitted to the Federal legislature for approval and I have to request you to confirm that this will be done at the appropriate time.

I beg your Excellency to accept the assurance of my high esteem.

IVONE KIRKPATRICK  
Chairman

October 23, 1950

**B. LETTER OF FEDERAL CHANCELLOR  
OF MARCH 6, 1951**

to: His Excellency, The Chairman of the Allied High Commission

In reply to your letter of 23 October 1950, I have the honor to inform you as follows:

I. The Federal Republic hereby confirms that it is liable for the prewar external debt of the German Reich, including those debts of other corporate bodies subsequently to be declared liabilities of the Reich, as well as for interest and other charges on securities of the Government of Austria, to the extent that such interest and charges become due after 12 March 1938 and before 8 May 1945.

The Federal Government understands that in the determination of the manner in which and the extent to which the Federal Republic will fulfill this liability, account will be taken of the general situation of the Federal Republic including, in particular, the effects of the limitations on its territorial jurisdiction and its capacity to pay.

II. The Federal Government acknowledges hereby in principle the debt arising from the economic assistance furnished to Germany since 8 May 1945, to the extent to which liability for such debt has not previously been acknowledged in the agreement of economic cooperation concluded on 15 December 1949 between the Federal Republic and the United States of America, or for which the Federal Republic has not already taken over responsibility under article 133 of the basic law. The Federal Government is ready to accord the obligations arising from the economic assistance priority over all other foreign claims against Germany or German nationals.

The Federal Government regards it as appropriate to regulate any questions connected with the recognition and settlement of these debts by bilateral agreements with

the Governments of the countries which have rendered economic assistance, patterned on the agreement concluded with the United States of America on 15 December 1949. The Federal Government takes for granted that these agreements will contain an arbitration clause for cases of dispute. The Federal Government is prepared at once to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of such agreements with the Governments concerned.

The Federal Government hereby expresses its desire to resume payments on the German external debt. It understands that there is agreement between it and the Governments of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of the United States of America on the following:

It is in the interest of the re-establishment of normal economic relations between the Federal Republic and other countries to work out as soon as possible a settlement plan which will govern the settlement of public and private claims against Germany and German nationals.

Interested Governments including the Federal Republic, creditors and debtors shall participate in working out this plan.

The settlement plan shall in particular deal with those claims, the settlement of which would achieve the objective of normalizing the economic and financial relations of the Federal Republic with other countries. It will take into account the general economic position of the Federal Republic, notably the increase of its burdens and the reduction in its economic wealth. The general effect of this plan shall neither dislocate the German economy through undesirable effects on the internal financial situation nor unduly drain existing or potential German foreign-exchange resources. It shall also not add appreciably to the financial burden of any occupation power.

The Governments concerned may obtain expert opinions on all questions (arising out of the negotiations of the settlement plan and on the capacity to pay).

The result of the negotiations shall be set forth in agreements. It is agreed that the plan will be provisional in nature and subject to revision as soon as Germany is reunited and a final peace settlement becomes possible.

I beg Your Excellency to accept the assurance of my high esteem.

ADENAUER

**C. LETTER TO FEDERAL CHANCELLOR  
OF MARCH 6, 1951**

to: His Excellency, The Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

In reply to your letter of 6 March 1951, on the subject of German indebtedness we have the honor, on behalf of the Governments of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, to acknowledge the undertakings of the Federal Government in regard to the responsibility of the Federal Republic for the prewar external debts of the German Reich and for the debt arising out of the economic assistance furnished to Germany by the three Governments since 8 May 1945.

With regard to the priority accorded to the obligations arising from the postwar economic assistance we are authorized to state that the three Governments would not propose to exercise this priority in such a way as to restrict settlement of foreign held claims arising out of trade subsequent to 8 May 1945, essential to the economic recovery of the Federal Republic.

With regard to the question of an arbitration clause in agreements covering the debts for postwar economic assistance, the three Governments will be prepared, when negotiating such agreements, to consider whether it would be useful to include an arbitration clause to deal with any matters which might be appropriately settled by such a procedure.

We further have the honor on behalf of the three Governments to confirm the understandings of the Federal Government as set forth in the second paragraph of

June 4, 1951

903

article 1 and in article 3 of Your Excellency's letter. They are now engaged in preparing proposals for the working out of settlement arrangements; these will provide for the participation of foreign creditors, German debtors, and interested governments including the Federal Government.

The proposals will be designed to arrive at an orderly overall settlement of prewar claims against Germany and German debtors and of the debt arising out of the postwar economic assistance, which would be fair and equitable to all the interests affected, including those of the Federal Government. It is the intention that the resulting settlement should be embodied in a multilateral agreement; any bilateral agreements that may be considered to be necessary would be concluded within the framework of the settlement plan. As soon as their proposals are ready the three Governments will communicate them to the Federal Government and to other interested Governments and will discuss with them these proposals and the procedure to be adopted for dealing with the subject.

We have the honor to state that our three Governments regard Your Excellency's letter under reference and this letter as placing on record an agreement between the Governments of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, on the one hand and the Government of the Federal Republic on the other, concerning the questions of German indebtedness covered in these letters. These letters are prepared in English, French and German, each text being equally authentic.

*The Chairman*  
*Allied High Commission*  
(ANDRÉ FRANÇOIS-PONCET)

## Enclosure 2

### PROPOSED PROCEDURE

1. In order to arrive at a settlement of German prewar and postwar external debts in cooperation with the interested parties, the three Governments have worked out a tentative procedure for organising consultations and negotiations, in which interested Governments, including the German Federal Government, and with representatives of debtors and creditors, would take part. In the meetings envisaged in this procedure the three Governments would be represented through the Tripartite Commission on German Debts.

2. The procedure is designed to lead to the conclusion of an intergovernmental agreement which would establish the general conditions under which outstanding debts would be settled between individual debtors and creditors.

3. In the view of the three Governments the agreement should be arrived at in such a way that its terms would be acceptable both to the Governments and to the various interests affected. This means that representatives not only of Governments but also of private creditor and debtor interests should have the opportunity to participate fully in working out the general settlement arrangements which would form the basis of the agreement. Their participation is in fact an essential step towards and constitutes in itself an element in the normalisation of Germany's international relations. On the other hand in view of their interest in the subject, the three Governments intend to participate fully in each stage of the procedure.

4. The following procedure is proposed:

(a) Consultations between the three Governments and the German Federal Government, the Governments of other countries with a significant creditor interest, and representative of creditors and debtors, on the implications of the statement on points of principle in Enclosure 3, on certain technical issues listed in Enclosure 4, and on the procedure itself. The purpose of the consultations is to explain these matters to the participants and to obtain their views on them and upon the practical methods of implementation. As a result of these consul-

tations, the three Governments would revise and elaborate the documents as necessary.

(b) Preparation of proposed settlement arrangements by the interested parties. The detailed organisation of meetings for this purpose and the procedure to be followed will be discussed in the consultations referred to above. It is however agreed that the procedure should allow for direct negotiations between representatives of debtors and creditors and for full participation by the Tripartite Commission acting on behalf of the three Governments.

(c) Conclusion of an intergovernmental agreement which would enter into force when signed and approved by the three Governments and the Government of the Federal Republic and to which other Governments would be able to accede.

5. The three Governments have considered the best way of organising the consultations referred to in paragraph 4 (a) and believe that it is desirable that a meeting should be held at which the interested parties, both governmental and private, should have an opportunity of expressing their views. It is proposed that such a meeting should be called in London in the autumn of this year.

6. In order to ensure that this meeting is productive and leads without undue delay to the negotiations envisaged in paragraph 4 (b), adequate preparation must be made. The three Governments intend that this preparation should include informal meetings with German representatives and with representatives of the principal creditor groups in the three countries, to which the Governments of four other countries which have a major creditor interest, namely Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland are being invited to appoint observers. Such meetings will be purely preliminary and designed to explore the issue and prepare the ground for the autumn meeting. Governments of creditor countries not represented will receive further documents drawn up after these informal meetings. It is hoped that through the circulation of the present and later documents all interested Governments will be able to consult the private creditor interests in their own countries and make adequate preparation for their participation at the autumn meeting.

7. Following a short visit to Bonn early in June to explain the procedure to the German Federal Government, the Tripartite Commission will hold the preliminary informal meetings referred to in paragraph 6 in London at the end of June. Thereafter it will complete its own preparatory work, and during August invitations will be issued to the full consultations which it is hoped will be held at the end of September. The negotiation of the general settlement arrangements and the preparation of the intergovernmental agreement would follow as soon as possible.

## Enclosure 3

### POINTS OF PRINCIPLE

#### I

1. The three Governments acting in conformity with their responsibilities and by reason of their position as the principal and priority creditors of Germany, have agreed with the Federal Government, in an exchange of letters of 6th March, 1951, between the Federal Chancellor and the Allied High Commission that a debt settlement plan should be worked out in the interest of the reestablishment of normal economic relations between the Federal Republic and other countries. The general purpose of this plan would be to provide for the settlement of the prewar external debts of Germany and of German debtors and of the debts for economic assistance extended to Germany since 8th May, 1945, by the three occupying powers.

2. It is the view of the three Governments that, in order to further the reestablishment of normal economic relations between the Federal Republic and other countries, the settlement should:—



(a) eliminate the state of default of Germany to the utmost extent possible by suitable treatment of matured and maturing debts and of arrears of interest;

(b) lead to a situation which would permit a return to normal debtor-creditor relationships by providing methods for settling these debts by agreement between the parties;

(c) be of such a character as to contribute to the recovery of Germany's international credit by the restoration of confidence in her financial standing and reliability as a borrower, while giving a reasonable assurance that Germany will not again default on her undertakings;

(d) be compatible with and as far as possible facilitate Germany's eventual compliance with obligations which members of the International Monetary Fund and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation have assumed with regard to the transfer of payments on current account, including interest and earnings on investments.

## II

3. The three Governments, which are also occupying powers, have a special and continuing interest both in the attainment of the above mentioned objectives and in the settlement arrangements adopted to promote them. They have indicated to the Federal Government in their letter of 23rd October, 1950, which continued to represent their views, that provided a settlement plan is worked out which is acceptable to them, they will modify the priority of their claims in respect to postwar economic assistance to the extent necessary to permit the fulfilment of such an agreed plan. To be acceptable the plan must conform to the following principles:

(a) It should take into account the general economic position of the Federal Republic; it should not dislocate the German economy through undesirable effects on the internal financial situation, nor unduly drain existing or potential German foreign exchange resources, and it should not add appreciably to the financial burden of any Occupying Power.

(b) It should provide for an orderly overall settlement of the debts to be included in the plan and assure fair and equitable treatment of all the interests affected, including those of the Federal Government.

(c) It should be subject to revision as soon as Germany is reunited and a final peace settlement becomes possible, and should be capable of adjustment in the light of changed circumstances.

In the view of the three Governments agreed procedures and controls must also be established to govern this settlement and all payments made under it.

4. The settlement of debts can only be put into effect by agreements between particular German debtors and their foreign creditors, but the three Governments have agreed that such individual settlements should conform to general settlement arrangements which would reflect the foregoing principles. These arrangements would be arrived at in negotiations between representatives of creditors and debtors, the Federal Government, the three Governments, and other interested Governments, and would be incorporated in an intergovernmental agreement. This agreement would provide patterns for the later agreements between the individual debtors and creditors. If a creditor does not wish to accept settlement in accordance with one or other of these patterns, then under the intergovernmental agreement there would be no present possibility of the debt being discharged.

5. It is clear that a settlement plan of the nature outlined above requires that all parties be prepared to make sacrifices in the interest of common agreement. It cannot be expected that creditors will make sacrifices unless the Germans make real efforts to meet their obligations and unless the German Federal Government on their side pursues such foreign exchange and internal fiscal policies as will enable German obligations to be met under the settlement agreement. The Germans must also bear in mind the heavy burden borne by many other countries.

On the other hand, other creditors, like the three Governments, will have to give due regard to Germany's present and future economic position, the other economic burdens which she has to bear, and the fact that she is still receiving governmental economic assistance from abroad.

6. The three Governments will give due consideration to the internal financial position of Germany and the budgetary position of the Federal Government, both of which will be affected by certain problems such as the impact of Western defence requirements.

## III

7. The settlement plan should provide that as a rule holders of existing debts denominated in foreign currencies should continue to hold obligations so denominated which would be serviced in foreign exchange. It is, therefore, the amount which Germany can afford to pay in foreign exchange that is likely to be the most important factor. At present Germany has small foreign exchange reserves and is continuing to receive foreign aid or credit. Although it is desirable that service on the debts should be resumed at an early date, it is evident that in the short run, while Germany continues to receive foreign aid, debt service on more than a limited scale would add appreciably to the financial burden of the three Governments. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that in the long run Germany's external payments can be balanced without the need for exceptional assistance. It is necessary, therefore, to make a distinction between what Germany can pay in the immediate future and what she can be expected to pay in the long run.

8. It seems clear the Germany will have sufficient resources to resume service payments on her external debts under a reasonable settlement arrangement provided that she is determined to do so and to accept the sacrifices which may be necessary for the sake of removing a serious obstacle to good relationships with others, improving her credit standing and opening the way to normal sources of credit. On the other hand, the volume of German prewar and postwar foreign indebtedness will be disproportionately large in relation to Germany's prospective ability to make payments thereon. Moreover, a large part of the prewar debts has matured and considerable amounts of interest are in arrears. In view of these factors a realistic approach by the creditors to the problem will be necessary, and this will probably involve adjustments of the terms of the debts. The methods and extent of such adjustments are matters which must be determined in the negotiation of the settlement plan.

## IV

9. Other questions for consideration arise from the prospect that some creditors will seek settlement of their debts in deutschemark (DM). Consideration must be given to what extent and under what conditions it would be possible to permit settlement in DM of foreign currency debts. It will be necessary to assure that the plan provides equitable treatment between creditors who receive payment in foreign currency and those who desire to receive payment in DM, and among creditors holding different categories of German debts. To the extent that any DM settlements may be permitted, it is considered that the use of the DM received will have to be controlled in order to reduce the potential loss of foreign exchange to the German economy and in order to channel these DM into long-term investment in Germany.

## V

10. The most practicable method of arriving at an equitable treatment of the various creditor groups would seem to be a process of negotiation among them with a view to reaching agreement respecting the treatment to be provided for the various types of claims in the settlement plan. Whatever method is adopted, however, the three Governments will wish to ensure that the settlement arrangements do not lead to inequity or preferential treatment as between some groups of creditors and others.



It will be the aim of the three Governments to see that all groups are properly represented, have a full opportunity to participate in working out the arrangements, and agree to the treatment of each type of claim in the settlement arrangements as a whole. They are agreed that the terms of the debt settlement should not vary according to the currencies in which obligations are denominated.

#### VI

11. Although the settlement arrangements must be sufficiently flexible to permit of revision when Germany is reunited and to allow the creditors to receive higher annual payments as Germany's ability to make payments improves, they should, nevertheless, provide a stable basis for future financial relations by giving both creditor and debtor a clear picture of their expectations in the future. This aim would not be achieved if there had to be frequent renegotiation of the terms of the settlement. Therefore, the settlement plan should go as far as possible in including provisions designed to obviate the need of any early renegotiation. For this purpose it will be necessary to provide in the plan for adjustment in the light of changes in the German economic situation and the manner in which this can be achieved is a subject which will require careful consideration during the course of the negotiations. The plan must in any case clearly contemplate the possibility of renegotiation at such time as Germany becomes reunited.

#### Enclosure 4

##### TECHNICAL QUESTIONS

In connection with the establishment of a plan for the settlement of German external debts a number of questions are expected to arise for consideration.

Among these are:

- (1) Whether German debts owed to foreign creditors which may not be strictly classifiable as external in character should be included in the plan;
- (2) questions connected with the operations of the Konversionskasse and Verrechnungskasse;
- (3) what debts of corporate bodies which functioned as Reich agencies constitute liabilities of the Reich;
- (4) the extent of the liability of the Federal Republic with regard to interest and other charges which became due after 12th March, 1938, and before 8th May, 1945, on securities of the Government of Austria;
- (5) specific problems relating to the debts of Prussia;
- (6) effect of the gold clause provisions in specific German obligations.

##### TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR TRIPARTITE COMMISSION ON GERMAN DEBTS

[Enclosure 5]

The Governments of France, United Kingdom and United States have decided to establish a commission to be known as the Tripartite Commission on German Debts for the purpose of carrying forward the work of the three Governments in preparing for the orderly overall settlement of German prewar debts and of the German debt arising out of postwar economic assistance, as envisaged in the agreement of 6th March, 1951, between the three Governments and the German Federal Government.

1. The Commission will have its headquarters in London.

2. The functions of the Commission will be:

(a) To serve as a means of coordinating the policies of the three Governments regarding foreign-held German debts.

(b) To take the necessary steps so that a plan for general settlement arrangements for these debts is worked out in consultation with the German Federal Government and other interested Governments and with representatives of creditors and debtors and so that the settlement arrangements are embodied in an intergovernmental agreement.

(c) To represent the three Governments:

(i) in the negotiations relative to these settlement arrangements and the intergovernmental agreement; and

(ii) in dealing with problems in connection with the settlement of postwar debts for economic assistance.

(d) To deal with such other matters relative to German debts as are referred to it by the three Governments.

3. In carrying out these functions the Commission will be guided by the agreed policies of the three Governments including the principles relating to German debts which were communicated to the Chancellor of the German Federal Republic in the letter of 23rd October, 1950, from the Allied High Commission and by the agreement of 6th March, 1951, between the three Governments and the German Federal Government.

#### Ban on Critical Materials Exports to East-West Trade Violators Urged

[Released to the press at Frankfurt, Bonn, and Washington May 22]

United States High Commissioner John J. McCloy today announced that he is recommending that the United States Government prohibit the shipment of critical export goods from the United States to any companies or persons in West Germany engaging in illegal trade with the Soviet orbit. This recommendation, the result of a long-term study, has been the subject of discussions between several United States departments at Washington and Hicog.

Hicog economics officials stressed the significance of this step in view of the large volume of much needed exports from the United States to West Germany.

The recommended ban on shipments will not affect United States food shipments to Germany but could affect many other kinds of United States exports to Germany.

This action follows the recent announcement of the Federal Chancellor that effective steps would be taken to combat illegal trade and deny scarce

raw materials to violators. It was pointed out that the ECA mission has repeatedly warned that East-West trade violators will get no ECA aid and that there is a constant check on end-use of ECA-financed goods to insure against misuse of these goods. One of the first conditions of the investment of ECA counterpart funds is that the firm concerned is not an East-West trade violator.

In the following letter to Chancellor Adenauer, Mr. McCloy informed the Federal Chancellor of his latest recommendation to Washington:

I was gratified to learn of your statement, dated April 28, 1951, in which you referred to the objectionable situation prevailing within the Federal Republic in the matter of illegal exports of strategic commodities to the East. I noted particularly, the expression of your firm intent to take effective steps in combating such illegal trade and denying scarce raw materials to violators, as one of the steps to be employed.

As you know the Government of the United States is profoundly concerned with this problem and is endeavoring to find an adequate solution to it in Germany, as well as in other parts of the Western world. Mr. Cattler, Chief of the ECA special mission to Western Germany, has informed your Government that no ECA counterpart funds will be approved for investment in any company which engages in illegal trade with the East. Recently, General Handy and I agreed to extend operations of the United States customs unit to the interzonal border of the United States zone, as well as the international border, where it had previously been stationed. Further, as you know, members of my staff in recent weeks have had numerous discussions with representatives of your Government, in reference to various aspects of illegal East-West trade. Information received by my staff confirms the serious state of affairs in this field.

In order to supplement measures which have recently been taken or announced, I would now like to ask you to institute all measures necessary to prevent any allocation of ECA dollars, or commodity imports for ECA dollars, to any person or company which engages in illegal trade with the Soviet orbit.

I would further like to advise you that I am recommending to my Government to prohibit certain exports from the United States to any companies or persons in Western Germany who, according to information coming to our attention, may be engaged in transactions of this nature.

Your offer of cooperation in this matter reflects your appreciation of the scope and significance of this problem and a determination to find an appropriate solution to it. This attitude is indeed gratifying, and I would like to ask you to instruct competent members of your government to meet with appropriate members of my staff, in order to arrive at mutually satisfactory arrangements on procedures and administration in this field in accordance with the objectives outlined in the foregoing paragraphs.

## **Stay of Executions of German War Criminals Lifted**

*[Released to the press May 21]*

The Department of State announced today that it has lifted the stay of executions of five German war criminals and has notified John J. McCloy, United States High Commissioner for Germany,

of its action. Final disposition of the cases is now in the hands of Mr. McCloy. Any additional information will be issued by the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany.

The sentences were stayed when counsel for the condemned men began appeal proceedings in the United States courts on February 14, 1951. Following the refusal of the United States Supreme Court to consider the cases, the United States Court of Appeals issued its mandate to the District Court, affirming the action of that Court. Today the District Court terminated the court proceedings by entering a final order affirming its dismissal of the petitions.

The five criminals involved are: Paul Blobel, Werner Braune, Erich Naumann, Otto Ohlendorf, and Oswald Pohl.

Two other death sentences of German war criminals are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense.

*[Released to the press May 24]*

The Department has been informed by the United States District Court that the Court has issued an order restraining the execution of the seven Landsberg war criminals until 10:00 a.m., Tuesday, May 29. The Department immediately notified United States High Commissioner McCloy of the stay of execution.

The Court has set 10:00 a.m., Monday for full argument.

## **Income-Tax Convention With Switzerland Signed**

*[Released to the press May 24]*

On May 24, 1951, Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, and Charles Bruggmann, Swiss Minister in Washington, signed a convention between the United States and Switzerland for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income.

The provisions of the convention are similar in general to those contained in income-tax conventions now in force between the United States and Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

The convention will be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. The convention provides that instruments of ratification shall be exchanged and that the convention shall become effective for taxable years beginning on or after January 1 of the year in which the exchange takes place, except that, if the exchange takes place on or after October 1, certain provisions shall have effect only for taxable years beginning on or after January 1 of the year next following the year in which the exchange takes place.

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### Calendar of Meetings <sup>1</sup>

#### Adjourned During May 1951

International Industries Fair . . . . .	Bombay . . . . .	Apr. 1-May 15
United Nations:		
Economic and Social Council:		
Human Rights Commission: 7th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 16-May 19
Population Commission: 6th Session . . . . .	Lake Success . . . . .	Apr. 23-May 4
Commission on Status of Women: 5th Session . . . . .	Lake Success . . . . .	Apr. 30-May 14
Fiscal Commission: 3d Session . . . . .	Lake Success . . . . .	May 7-18
Statistical Commission: 6th Session . . . . .	Lake Success . . . . .	May 7-18
Technical Assistance Board . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	May 8-15
Economic Commission for Europe: Coal Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 22*-25*
WHO (World Health Organization):		
Special Committee on International Sanitary Regulations . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 9-May 5
Fourth Assembly . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 7-26
Pan American Sanitary Organization: 13th Meeting of Executive Committee.	Washington . . . . .	Apr. 23-May 1
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization:		
Middle East Conference To Explain U. N. to Teachers . . . . .	Beirut . . . . .	Apr. 24-May 6
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
International Poplar Commission: 5th Session . . . . .	United Kingdom . . . . .	Apr. 25-May 2
Paris International Trade Fair . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Apr. 28-May 14
International Textile Exposition . . . . .	Lille . . . . .	Apr. 28-May 20
WHO (World Meteorological Organization): Executive Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Apr. 30-May 1
Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly . . . . .	Strasbourg . . . . .	May 6-19
Caribbean Commission: 12th Meeting . . . . .	Barbados . . . . .	May 7-12
ILO (International Labor Organization): 4th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 7-19
Joint Maritime Commission . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 21-26
South Pacific Commission: 7th Session . . . . .	Nouméa . . . . .	Apr. 28-May 7
American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood, Annual Meeting of the Directing Council.	Montevideo . . . . .	May 11-12

#### In Session as of May 31, 1951

United Nations:		
General Assembly, 5th Regular Session . . . . .	Lake Success . . . . .	Sept. 19-
Economic and Social Council:		
Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 6th Session . . . . .	Lake Success . . . . .	Apr. 10-
Economic, Employment and Development Commission . . . . .	Lake Success . . . . .	May 14-
Economic Commission for Latin America: 4th Session . . . . .	Mexico City . . . . .	May 28-
International Law Commission: 3d Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 15-
Intergovernmental Study Group on Germany . . . . .	London . . . . .	Jan. 30-
International Materials Conference . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Feb. 26-
Council of Foreign Ministers, Meeting of Deputies . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Mar. 5-
Four Power Conference on Swiss Allied Accord . . . . .	Bern . . . . .	Mar. 5-
International Exhibition of Textile Arts and Fashion; Art Exhibit.	Turin . . . . .	Apr. 1-
ITU (International Telecommunication Union):		
Sixth Session of the Administrative Council . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 16-
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization): Working Group on Draft International Convention Regarding Status of NATO Representatives and International Staff.	London . . . . .	Apr. 16-
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Communications Division: 4th Session . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	Apr. 24-
Festival of Britain . . . . .	England . . . . .	May 3-

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State.

\*Tentative



# Calendar of Meetings—Continued

## In Session as of May 31, 1951—Continued

9th International Exhibition of Decorative and Industrial Arts and Modern Architecture.	Milan. . . . .	May 5-
UPU (Universal Postal Union):		
Executive and Liaison Commission: 14th Session . . . . .	St. Gallen . . . . .	May 21-
FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Nutrition: 2d Session. . . . .	Rome . . . . .	May 22-
Fourth Canadian International Trade Fair. . . . .	Toronto . . . . .	May 28-
FAO Working Party on Long-Term Program . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	May 28-
WHO Consultative Committee for Europe: 1st Session. . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 28-
WHO-UNICEF Joint Committee on Health Policy . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 31-
ILO Governing Body: 115th Session. . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 28-
Inter-American Commission of Women . . . . .	Santiago . . . . .	May 30-

## Scheduled June 1-August 31, 1951

Statistical Institute, Inter-American: 1st Session of the Committee for the Improvement of National Statistics.	Washington . . . . .	June 2-
WHO Executive Board: 8th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 4-
ICAO 5th Assembly . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	June 5-
Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	June 5-
ITU (International Telecommunication Union):		
International Radio Consultative Committee: 6th Plenary Meeting.	Geneva . . . . .	June 5-
Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	August 16-
United Nations:		
Permanent Central Opium Board and Narcotic Drugs Supervisory Body: 5th Joint Session.	Geneva . . . . .	June 5-
Trusteeship Council: 9th Session . . . . .	Lake Success . . . . .	June 11-
Economic and Social Council:		
Regional Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations on U. N. Information.	Managua . . . . .	June 9-
Economic Commission for Europe: Timber Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 11-
Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations . . . . .	Lake Success . . . . .	June 11-
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons.	Geneva . . . . .	July 2-
Regional Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations on United Nations Information.	Indonesia . . . . .	July 10-
Economic and Social Council—Economic Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 23-
Economic and Social Council—Agenda Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 23-
Economic and Social Council: 13th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 30-
Intergovernmental Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction.	Geneva . . . . .	Aug. 1-
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
34th International Labor Conference . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 6-
116th Session of Governing Body . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 2-
Meeting of Experts on the Status and Conditions of Employment of Domestic Workers.	Geneva . . . . .	July 2-
UPU (Universal Postal Union):		
Technical Transit Committee: 2d Meeting . . . . .	Pontresina . . . . .	June 6-
13th International Congress of Actuaries. . . . .	The Hague . . . . .	June 7-
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Council: 12th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 11-
Meeting of Mechanical Wood Technology . . . . .	Strobl, Austria . . . . .	Aug. 12*
Statistical Institute, Inter-American, 4th Session of Committee on the 1950 Census of the Americas.	Washington . . . . .	June 11
International Aeronautical Exposition, Nineteenth . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 15-
13th International Congress of Military Medicine and Pharmacy . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 17-
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization:		
General Conference: 6th Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 18-
Seminar on Teaching of Visual Arts in General Education . . . . .	Bristol . . . . .	July 7-
Seminar on Teaching of History . . . . .	Sevres . . . . .	July 11-
Executive Board: 26th Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 11-
International Sugar Council . . . . .	London . . . . .	June 25-
Fifth Session of the International Wheat Council . . . . .	London . . . . .	June 13-
International Penal and Penitentiary Commission . . . . .	Bern . . . . .	July 2-
Building Exhibition, Constructa: 25th . . . . .	Hannover . . . . .	July 3-
Conference of British Commonwealth Survey Officers . . . . .	London . . . . .	July 9-
Public Education, 14th International Congress . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 12-
International Commission for the Regulation of Whaling: 3d Meeting	Capetown . . . . .	July 23-
Wool Study Group: 5th Meeting . . . . .	London . . . . .	July
International Congress of Entomology, 9th . . . . .	Amsterdam . . . . .	Aug. 17-
International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art, 12th . . . . .	Venice . . . . .	Aug. 8-
Izmir International Trade Fair . . . . .	Izmir . . . . .	Aug. 20-
Geodesy and Geophysics, International Union of: 9th General Assembly.	Brussels . . . . .	Aug. 21-
NATO: 7th Session . . . . .	Europe* . . . . .	August*

\*Tentative

## Nineteenth Report of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

FOR THE PERIOD APRIL 1-15, 1951<sup>1</sup>

U.N. doc. S/2156  
Dated May 18, 1951

I herewith submit report number 19 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 April, inclusive. United Nations Command communiqués provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Enemy forces offered only sporadic resistance until 8 April when all regular Chinese Communist and north Korean forces to the east of the Imjin River had been driven out of the Republic of Korea. Thereafter, enemy forces on their main line of resistance bitterly contested United Nations advances. The most intense fighting of the period took place on the central front along the Hantanchon River east of its confluence with the Imjin, along the southern approaches to the Hwachon reservoir and dam, and along the Soyang River a few miles to the east. Fighting was also intense in the Changam area. In his defensive efforts, the enemy has demonstrated increased strength in artillery and mortars. During the period, United Nations forces advanced eight to fifteen miles over the front west of Chongong.

Although the enemy has remained on the defensive since mid February, only partially exploiting his enormous potential of more than sixty divisions, he retains the capability of assuming the offensive at any time. Marked increase in ac-

tivity in the hostile rear has been accompanied by a continued deployment of combat forces into forward areas. Daily vehicle sightings in late March and early April repeatedly pass the 2,000 mark, and the traffic pattern indicates that the enemy has expanded his central front buildup westward into the Kumchon area, opposite the west flank of the United Nations Eighth Army. Three or more Chinese Communist Forces Armies have recently displaced into this area.

Front lines at the close of the period ran generally northeast along the Imjin River to Chongong, east to Hwachon and Inje, and thence to Hupchiri on the east coast.

Guerrilla activity in United Nations rear areas has declined to the lowest point since the outbreak of the Korean conflict, as the dissident bands seek to avoid contact with United Nations forces. United Nations security forces have continued to ferret out and destroy guerrilla units at every opportunity, and have greatly reduced their effective strength in the past three months. As the main enemy forces resume the offensive, the guerrillas may be expected to again become aggressive, but their potential threat to United Nations logistical facilities is much less than before.

United Nations naval forces continued effective denial to the enemy of the use of Korean coastal waters while assuring the unrestricted movement of United Nations shipping to and from Korea. Gunfire support of ground forces was limited to occasional missions on the east coast of Korea. Surface units continued the unremitting program of interdiction by naval gunfire of enemy lines of communications in the Wonsar, Songjin and Chongjin areas. Naval carrier based aircraft, including the Marine Air Wing ashore, flew missions on a daily basis in close support of United Nations ground forces concentrating on the front lines in the western and central sectors. Successful harassment on enemy transportation routes, on east coastal railways and highways and armed reconnaissance in central area was carried out by these Naval aircraft, as well as methodical checks on enemy airfields, small boat and troop movements. A raiding force of British Royal Marine

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security Council, on May 18. For texts of the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh reports to the Security Council on U.N. command operation in Korea, see BULLETIN, of Aug. 7, 1950, p. 203; Aug. 28, 1950, p. 323; and Sept. 11, 1950, p. 403; Oct. 2, 1950, p. 534; Oct. 16, 1950, p. 603; Nov. 6, 1950, p. 729; Nov. 13, 1950, p. 759; Jan. 8, 1951, p. 43, and Feb. 19, 1951, p. 304, respectively. The reports which have been published separately as Department of State publications 3935, 3955, 3962, 3978, 3986, 4006, 4015, and 4108 respectively will appear hereafter only in the BULLETIN. The twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth reports appear in the BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1951, p. 470; the fifteenth and sixteenth reports in the BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1951, p. 625; the seventeenth report in the BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1951, p. 710; the eighteenth in BULLETIN of May 7, 1951, p. 755; and for text of a special report by the U.N. Commanding General, see BULLETIN of May 21, 1951, p. 828.

commandos, supported by United Nations surface units and carrier based aircraft, landed in the Songjin area, demolished a section of the coastal railroad and withdrew without suffering losses.

Check minesweeping operations were continued along the Korean east coast for the protection of gunfire support ships. Drifting mines continued to menace shipping in the Sea of Japan.

United Nations dominance of the skies over Korea continued despite repeated challenges by an increasing number of enemy Russian-built MIG jet planes. The air battles have taken place practically every day in the general Sinuiju-Sinaju area to which the enemy has restricted his operations by basing his short-range jets in Manchuria. Despite the advantages of the haven north of the Yalu, the Communists losses have been extremely heavy compared to those of the United Nations forces. The greatest air battle of the war took place on 12 April when about 225 United Nations and hostile planes clashed near Sinuiju.

Medium bombers, while continuing their interdiction efforts over all north Korea, have several times attacked the Korean ends of the bridges over the Yalu River. The enemy's concern about the damage to his attempted build-up is indicated by his continued attempted interceptions despite significant daily losses.

Close support of ground forces and disruption of transportation nearer the battle area were continued by the tactical elements of United Nations air forces. Night operations against the increasing vehicular traffic are being expanded with considerable success.

Enemy efforts to maintain north Korean airfields in operable condition are being countered by attacks utilizing bombs, napalm, rockets and machine guns. His continued efforts in this regard give indication of his intent, or at least desire, to renew his air efforts against United Nations forces in areas other than northwest Korea. Intelligence reports indicate there is much air-training activity in various areas of China and Manchuria.

High praise must be paid to the elements engaged in evacuation by air of wounded personnel and of individuals from behind enemy lines. Countless numbers of wounded who would surely have died and of men who would have become prisoners have been saved by prompt and efficient action of the air rescue and evacuation units. The wounded United Nations soldier in Korea has a better chance of recovery than had the soldier of any previous war, not only by virtue of improved medical treatments available at all echelons, but also in large measure because of his ready accessibility to major medical installations provided by rapid air evacuation.

The enemy continues to violate the laws of war in Korea. Since the last report, three new cases of atrocities have been substantiated. These incidents in which the Armed Forces of north Korea

and Communist China have violated accepted standards for the conduct of war have been reported: On or about 29 January 1951, a patrol from the 5th Marine Regiment was dispatched on a mission north of Yongchon. The patrol, consisting of ten Marines and one south Korean, never returned. On or about 7 March 1951, the bodies of ten Americans, reported by local inhabitants to have been captured on or about 30 January 1951 by guerrillas, were found with fifteen bodies of Republic of Korea personnel in a mass grave at Nakchon-Dong. The victims were found with their hands tied, the condition of the bodies indicating they had been beaten, knifed, mutilated and shot at close range.

A soldier of the 2d Infantry Division was captured by Chinese troops on or about 12 February 1951 near Hoengsong. The Chinese poured gasoline over him and set him afire. The victim was recovered by United Nations troops on or about 21 February 1951 and died on 24 February of second degree burns and emaciation.

On or about 26 September 1950 a captured United States soldier was being held at the Peoples Hospital, Kunsang-Ni, Chinan, Korea. He was marched a short distance from the hospital and executed by two members of the north Korean Security Forces. The body was buried by villagers in a Korean Cemetery.

Unconfirmed atrocities, recently reported, are under active investigation. The reports include a massacre of 228 political prisoners at the Holdong Gold Mine, clubbing to death of twenty civilians at Hongnong Myon and the execution of thirteen political prisoners at Gooncha Myon.

In leaflets, loudspeaker broadcasts, and radio broadcasts to enemy soldiers and to Korean civilians, particular emphasis is being placed on regularly restating the United Nations Korean objectives of peace, unification, and rehabilitation. The desire of the United Nations to prevent expansion of the conflict and to arrange a peaceful settlement is kept constantly before soldier and civilian alike. The importance of wide transmission of this information is manifested by recurring reports that Communist political officers are regularly falsifying the facts to deceive their own forces and compel them to continue to support the cause of aggression. A new series of radio programs entitled "Spirit of Freedom" dramatizes for the Korean people the story of the United Nations Forces fighting in their support. More than 326 million leaflets have now been disseminated in Korea.

On 11 April 1951, eight months and eighteen days after the activation of the United Nations Command for the prosecution of the Korean effort, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur relinquished command to the undersigned.

RIDGWAY



## The United States in the United Nations

[May 25-31, 1951]

### General Assembly

*The Committee of Twelve (AEC-CCA).*—At a meeting on May 25, the United States representative, Frank C. Nash, presented the United States proposal for the establishment of a single commission to coordinate the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. This plan proposes that the new commission should be established under and report to the Council, which in turn should submit periodic progress reports to the General Assembly. The functions include:

The primary task of the new commission should be to prepare comprehensive and coordinated plans for the international control of all armaments and armed forces, and accordingly, would provide for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces, including internal security and police forces.

The new commission should build upon the work already developed by the AEC and the CCA. The United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons should continue to serve as the basis for any plan for the control of atomic energy unless and until a better and no less effective system can be devised.

Mr. Nash stated that in the view of the United States, the work of the AEC and the CCA—

... has now reached a point where it is appropriate to consider ways and means of initiating the requisite coordination and expansion in a comprehensive system of control. ... In proposing the establishment of a new and consolidated commission to take over the work of the two present commissions, the United States delegation has in view the further important objective of possibly relieving the atmosphere of stalemate which has prevailed in the two commissions for some time past. ... It is our hope that the demonstration by the peace-loving nations of the world of their determination to stand together, strengthened and united in effective opposition against any further aggression, may lead to a change in some of these fundamental disagreements. Then ... we may have a chance of getting ahead with our work toward disarmament.

Only two other delegates, Dr. H. R. Wei (China), and S. K. Tsarapkin (U.S.S.R.), commented on the proposal at this meeting. Dr. Wei stated that the plan was a valuable contribution and had the correct approach to the problem. The U.S.S.R. delegate voiced objections to the "so-called new United States proposal," which he stated stipulated that the new commission was to base its work on "the same old, obsolete, and unacceptable" United States plan for atomic energy control. In reply, Mr. Nash (U. S.) commented

that the United States had no intention of offering a "new" proposal, and that the Soviet Union had urged a merger of the two commissions some years back. "I am frankly disappointed," he said, "that this new step now lacks U.S.S.R. support."

The Committee, established under the General Assembly resolution of December 13, 1950, is required to submit a report of its work to the next session of the Assembly.

The Committee adopted a United States formal motion (11-1 (U.S.S.R.)-0) authorizing the Secretariat to prepare a study of the activities of the League of Nations in the disarmament field.

### Economic and Social Council

*Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA).*—The fourth session of ECLA opened at Mexico City on May 28. The Commission is composed of 20 Latin American countries, and France, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the United States. Ambassador Merwin L. Bohan heads the United States delegation.

The items on the agenda include: (1) Economic survey of Latin America for 1950; (2) foreign-trade problems; (3) joint work program of ECLA and Fao; and (4) coordination between ECLA and the Inter-American Economic and Social Council.

*Economic Commission for Europe (ECE).*—The sixth session of the Commission convened at Geneva on May 29. Representatives of 17 European member countries of the United Nations, and the United States, are attending the session. Milton Katz is the United States representative.

The items on the agenda include: (1) Reports of the activities over the past year of the principal ECE Committees; (2) a statement by the Executive secretary, Gunnar Myrdal (Sweden), on the past and future work of the Commission; and (3) Secretariat's annual survey of the European economic situation and problems.

### Specialized Agencies

*World Health Organization (WHO).*—The Fourth World Health Assembly, legislative body of WHO, at its final plenary meeting, May 25, adopted a single code of International Sanitary Regulations to replace all the existing sanitary conventions for health protection in international trade and travel. The new regulations do not require ratification by member states and will automatically come into force on October 1, 1952.

As a result of the Assembly's decisions on pro-

gram questions, it is expected that for the first time, 1952, there will be a world-wide coordinated pattern of international health work financed by WHO, UNICEF, and the United Nations technical assistance program.

The Assembly adopted a 1952 budget for WHO of almost 7.7 million dollars, a 25 percent increase over this year's figure.

Three countries—Japan, Spain, and Germany—were admitted to the WHO.

### Security Council

The Council met on May 29. After expressions of sympathy on the death of Dr. José Philadelpho de Barros e Azevedo on May 7, the members unanimously adopted the proposal of President Selim Sarper (Turkey) to hold a separate election to fill the vacancy in the International Court of Justice during the next session of the General Assembly prior to the regular election, during that session, of successors to five other judges whose terms of office expire in February 1952.

The President then took up the matter contained in the following two letters received from the Pakistan Government: (a) Letter to the President of the Council, dated May 4, from Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan, Pakistan Minister of Foreign Affairs, calling attention to "a report which has appeared in the press in India and Pakistan that the Yuvaraja of Jammu and Kashmir issued a proclamation on April 30, 1951, for convoking a constituent assembly in the State," (b) letter to the President of the Council, dated May 8, from Ahmed S. Bokhari, Pakistan permanent representative to the United Nations, calling attention to an "extract from Sheikh Abdulla's (Prime Minister of the Indian-occupied Kashmir) speech delivered by him at Srinager on the 4th of May 1951 . . . 'We have decided after long deliberations to convene Constituent Assembly to decide future shape and affiliation of Kashmir and no power can veto its decision.'"

Ahmed S. Bokhari (Pakistan) discussed the two communications received by the Council and reviewed previous statements made by the delegates expressing concern over the Constituent Assembly and its possible implications. He stated that the responsibility for the convoking of the Assembly rested with the Indian Government and held that the question of the constitution should be taken up only after the question of accession had been settled. He felt that the device of the so-called Assembly would be a most unhappy augury for the future.

Rajeshwar Dayal (India) declared that the Indian attitude had already been clearly stated previously by Sir Benegal N. Rau (India), who had pointed out that Kashmir as a unit of the Indian federation had to follow the usual constitutional processes and that the proposed Constituent Assembly was not intended to prejudice the question of accession. Sir Benegal had said, and

this continued to be the position of the Indian Government, that the Assembly could not physically be prevented from expressing its opinion on the question of accession if it so chose, but this opinion would not bind the Indian Government nor prejudice the position of the Security Council.

Sir Gladwyn Jebb (U. K.) stated that his Government "greatly regrets" that the Security Council had to resume the discussion of this matter so soon and believed that the statement of Sheikh Abdulla, rejecting the Council resolutions, would inevitably create a "painful impression." However, in view of the reassuring remarks of the representatives of India, he proposed that the President of the Council communicate with both parties in order to draw their attention to the apprehensions expressed in the Council and express the hope that the two Governments would do everything possible to prevent the Kashmir authorities from acting in a manner prejudicial to the Security Council.

Ambassador Ernest A. Gross (U. S.) supported Sir Jebb's remarks and proposal. He cited the provision of the Security Council resolution of March 30 with regard to the Constituent Assembly, and also called attention to paragraph 8 of that resolution. He noted it was true that Sir Benegal N. Rau's (India) assurances stated that no prejudicial action was intended and it was "gratifying" to hear a reaffirmation of these assurances. However, Sheikh Abdulla did not seem to agree with these statements of the Indian representatives. He added that the United Nations representative, Dr. Frank P. Graham, would leave for the subcontinent within the next few weeks and it was not only right but necessary that he should arrive there in an atmosphere clear of the doubts raised at this meeting. The United States hoped that both parties and the Security Council would concentrate on the primary objective of aiding the United Nations representative to accomplish his mission. He reemphasized that the United States favored a settlement acceptable to both parties.

After the other members, with the exception of the U.S.S.R., had commented along the same lines as the United Kingdom and United States, the President read the text of the letter he proposed to send to both Governments. It noted with satisfaction the assurances of the representatives of India that the Assembly was not intended to prejudice the issues before the Security Council. It pointed out, on the other hand, that the communications from Pakistan on the convening and purpose of the Assembly would, if true, involve procedures in conflict with the commitments of the parties involved. The letter recalled the operative paragraph 8 of the March 30 resolution and said a full record of the May 29 meeting would be forwarded to both parties.

The letter was approved 9-0-2 (U.S.S.R., India).

## Negotiating a Peace in Palestine

### STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR AUSTIN U.S. REPRESENTATIVE IN SECURITY COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>

Last week, in participating in sponsoring this Council's resolution calling for a cease-fire in the present unfortunate dispute between Israel and Syria, I urged the necessity of prompt consideration of the complaints which we have now had on our agenda for the last few weeks under "The Palestine Question."

Fortunately, with the passage of the intervening days between our last meeting and this one, we have received reassuring indications that the fighting in and around the demilitarized zone has ceased as ordered. Today, therefore, I believe we may consider these complaints more dispassionately and with a clearer understanding of the facts and of the necessity for prompt Council action.

I think that the urgency of Council action can be readily appreciated by all of us, for delay in acting here, delays the realization of peace in Palestine. Furthermore, the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, General Riley, should have had a much longer period of convalescence; he has returned to his post in Palestine, and we should see to it that he and the parties in the dispute have material evidence of our determination that this present dispute shall be resolved promptly and that future disputes shall be prevented.

#### Strengthening the Negotiating Machinery

As a result of what has been heard here before the Council, the impression may have been created in the minds of some of us that the negotiating machinery provided for in the general armistice agreement is incapable of handling this present dispute. This is clearly not so. I believe we may with confidence note the assurances given us by General Riley at the Council's meeting on April 25, when he stated that he was confident that the armistice agreement could be made to work; that it had worked well for almost 2 years and that

it certainly was in the interest of the parties that they should make it work.

The United States strongly supports General Riley's position, but, in view of the critical nature of the present situation in Palestine, it deems it desirable for the Council to consider with care the complaints before us in order to see what may be done to strengthen the existing negotiating machinery.

#### Examining the Armistice Agreements

In supporting General Riley's view that the Mixed Armistice Commission can and should handle nearly all of the complaints before us, the United States believes that a number of these complaints should be returned to the Mixed Armistice Commission for prompt decisions and equally prompt implementation of the decisions.

In returning these complaints to the Mixed Armistice Commission, the Council would do well, in my Government's view, to avoid passing judgment on such of those complaints as the Commission is capable of handling. Not only would such action by the Council duplicate and possibly prejudge decisions of the Commission but it would also lessen the inclination of the parties to exhaust the remedies to which they have agreed before coming to this Council. A new problem might follow a possible conflict of judgment. It should be obvious, I believe, that lasting peace in Palestine will more readily come from decisive negotiation between the parties—particularly where avenues of negotiation already exists—than from decisions demanded of this Council by parties unwilling to negotiate.

The United States believes the Mixed Armistice Commission should act upon the complaints referred to it. In taking this position, it also believes that the Council can render assistance to the parties and to the negotiating machinery by enunciating general considerations which it believes should guide the settlement of the present difficulties.

The Council should be prepared to pass judgment on those matters which, in its opinion, have implications beyond the Commission's jurisdiction. It would appear essential that the parties

<sup>1</sup> Made in the Security Council on May 16 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.



be instructed to settle their dispute through the Commission and that the Council should consider ways and means for facilitating the negotiations.

The Council now has before it a number of complaints from the Governments of Syria and Israel. It is regrettably apparent from the statements of Israel and Syria that there are wide divergencies between the views of the two countries, both in the statements of their representatives before the Council and in the claims and counterclaims of the two Governments reported to this Council by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. At the same time, we have the opinions and views of the Truce Supervision Organization itself, and the statements, and answers to questions, by Maj. Gen. William E. Riley.

In signing the various armistice agreements, Israel, on the one hand, and Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, on the other, agreed that the United Nations would assist the parties in the supervision of the application and observance of the terms of those agreements. The Truce Supervision Organization has played an important role in connection with carrying out the provisions of the armistice agreements. The United States believes that the Council should give great weight to the account of the recent events given by this United Nations body of impartial observers chosen from the armed forces of Belgium, France, and the United States.

#### **Situation in the Demilitarized Zone**

In the view of the United States, the basic cause for the present situation in the demilitarized zone has been the conflict of views over the rights and responsibilities of the United Nations Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission in the demilitarized zone. In examining what these responsibilities are, we must look, therefore, at the record of the negotiations which preceded the armistice as well as at the agreement itself.

On June 25, 1949, Dr. Ralph Bunche, the acting mediator for Palestine, expressed himself in a letter to the Syrian and Israeli Governments on the manner in which the demilitarized zone would operate. Dr. Bunche stated in this letter, in part, as follows:

The provision for the demilitarized zone in the light of all circumstances is the most that can be reasonably expected in an armistice agreement by either party. Questions of permanent boundaries, territorial sovereignty, customs, trade relations and the like must be dealt with in the ultimate peace settlement and not in the armistice agreement.

I would point out again that previous arrangements for demilitarized zones involving United Nations responsibility as at El-Auma, Government House, and Mount Scopus have worked satisfactorily and have served to protect fully the interests and claims of rival parties pending final settlement. The proposed demilitarized zone in the agreement now under negotiation will work equally well. The United Nations will insure this since its honor and effectiveness will be involved.

I may also assure both parties that the United Nations, through the Chairman of the proposed Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission will also insure that the demilitarized zone will not be a vacuum or wasteland and that normal civilian life under normal local civilian administration and policing will be operative in the zone.

In this regard I would point out that in view of the relatively small area involved and the limited number of settlements or villages in it the administration and policing problem is not at all a severe or greatly complicated one and can be readily solved. I would also point out that in the projected Mixed Armistice Commission both parties will have an opportunity to discuss and agree upon details affecting this or any other aspect of the armistice agreement, and that the United Nations will find fully satisfactory any subsequent arrangements based on mutual agreement of the two parties. The sole function of the United Nations is to assist the parties in reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement and in giving them such help as they may mutually request in implementing and supervising the terms of the agreement.

Of even greater significance in considering this dispute is the definitive comments which were inserted into the records of the armistice conference between Israel and Syria on July 3, 1949, which both parties agreed constituted an authoritative statement of the armistice agreement. This statement, in our view, sets forth a definitive interpretation of the rights of the chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission in the demilitarized zone. These comments were quoted by General Riley in his statement before the Council on April 25 and, as I stated above, are included in the four-power draft resolution.

With regard to the actual supervision of the demilitarized zone itself, I should like to refer to article 5 of the Israeli-Syrian armistice agreement which provides for its establishment. This zone may be seen on the map attached to the armistice agreement and is divided in a northern, southern, and a central sector.

Article 5 of paragraph 2 of the armistice agreement states:

In pursuance of the spirit of the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948 the armistice demarcation line and the demilitarized zone have been defined with a view toward separating the armed forces of the two parties in such manner to minimize the possibility of friction and incidence while providing for the gradual restoration of normal civilian life and without prejudice to the ultimate settlement.

Paragraph 5c of the same article states:

The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission established in article 7 of this agreement and United Nations observers attached to the Commission shall be responsible for insuring the full implementation of this article.

Paragraph 5e states:

The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be empowered to authorize the return of civilians to villages and settlements in the demilitarized zone and the employment of limited numbers of locally recruited civilian police in the zone for internal security purposes and shall be guided in this regard by the schedule of withdrawal referred to in subparagraph d of this article.

## Discussion of the Resolution

From the foregoing, it seems clear that the armistice agreement provides for the gradual restoration of normal civilian life in the zone and that this gradual restoration is without prejudice to the ultimate settlement. The agreement also provides that the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, who may be the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization or an officer designated by him, is responsible for insuring the full implementation of article 5 and is also empowered to authorize the return of civilians to villages and settlements in the zone and the employment of limited numbers of locally recruited civilian police for internal security purposes.

It is my Government's view that article 5 of the armistice agreement formally establishes that the United Nations chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, and not Israel or Syria, is the responsible party for general supervision of the administration of the demilitarized zone which will take place on a local basis and that this authority has been acquiesced in by both of the parties. It is believed that this situation obtains until Israel and Syria reach an agreement to the contrary or a modification of the armistice agreement is made. In the individual villages and settlements in the demilitarized zone, it seems clear that the local authority lies with the local officials, either Arab or Israeli, but outside of their immediate jurisdiction it would not appear from the agreement that they could undertake activities in the demilitarized zone contrary to the requests or recommendations of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission. In the present instance, we have an example of one of the parties claiming to interpret correctly article 5 of the armistice agreement in deciding what constitutes normal civilian life in the zone. I should like to call attention to the fact that the armistice agreement provides appropriate means whereby an interpretation of article 5 may be made. In this connection, I should like to draw attention to article 7, paragraph 8, which states:

Where interpretation of the meaning of particular provisions of this agreement other than the preamble and articles 1 and 2 is at issue, the Commission's interpretation shall prevail.

The Council, now, has before it a resolution which has been introduced by the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, and the United States. It is the view of my Government that the passage of this resolution by the Council will clarify and strengthen the responsibilities and duties of the Chairman of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission. My Government is glad to note that fighting in the area in question has ceased. It is the hope of my Government that the adoption of the resolution which you now have before you will further contribute to the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the area.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate my Gov-

ernment's conviction that, if peace is to come in the Palestine area, the major responsibility for such peace rests upon the parties in the area. They have the means for maintaining the armistice that now exists, if they will use it in good faith. This means full cooperation with the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, the rendering of all necessary facilities to the United Nations observers in the performance of their duties, and a will to abide by decisions reached by the Commission or by its chairman, whichever has jurisdiction in the case. The role of this Council should remain that of strengthening the existing armistice machinery when it is necessary, of considering complaints of the parties only when all their other remedies have been exhausted, and of constantly reminding the parties of their overriding obligations to establish a lasting peace among themselves.

## TEXT OF RESOLUTION

U. N. doc. S/2152/Rev. 1  
Adopted May 18, 1951  
Vote: 10-0-1

The Security Council,

RECALLING its past resolutions of 15 July 1948, 11 August 1949, 17 November 1950 and 8 May 1951 relating to the armistice agreements between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States and to the provisions contained therein concerning methods for maintaining the armistice and resolving disputes through the Mixed Armistice Commissions participated in by the parties to the Armistice Agreement;

NOTING the complaints of Syria and Israel to the Security Council, statements in the Council of the representatives of Syria and Israel, the reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the Chief of Staff and the Acting Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for Palestine, and statements before the Council by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for Palestine;

NOTING that the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization in a memorandum of 7 March 1951, and the Chairman of the Syrian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission on a number of occasions have requested the Israel Delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commission to insure that the Palestine Land Development Company, Limited, is instructed to cease all operations in the demilitarized zone until such time as an agreement is arranged through the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission for continuing this project, and,

NOTING further that Article V of the General Armistice Agreement gives to the Chairman the responsibility for the general supervision of the demilitarized zone,

*Endorses* the requests of the Chief of Staff and the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission on this matter and calls upon the Government of Israel to comply with them,

*Declares* that in order to promote the return of permanent peace in Palestine, it is essential that the Governments of Israel and Syria observe faithfully the General Armistice Agreement of 20 July 1949,

*Notes* that under Article 7, paragraph 8, of the Armistice Agreement, where interpretation of the meaning of a particular provision of the agreement, other than the preamble and Articles I and II, is at issue, the Mixed Armistice Commission's interpretation shall prevail,

*Calls upon* the Governments of Israel and Syria to bring before the Mixed Armistice Commission or its Chairman, whichever has the pertinent responsibility under the Armistice Agreement, their complaints and to abide by the decisions resulting therefrom,

*Considers* that it is inconsistent with the objectives



and intent of the Armistice Agreement to refuse to participate in meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission or to fail to respect requests of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission as they relate to his obligations under Article V and calls upon the parties to be represented at all meetings called by the Chairman of the Commission and to respect such requests.

*Calls upon* the parties to give effect to the following excerpt cited by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization at the 542nd meeting of the Security Council on 25 April 1951, as being from the summary record of the Syria-Israel Armistice Conference of 3 July 1949, which was agreed to by the parties as an authoritative comment on Article V of the Syria-Israel Armistice Agreement:

'The question of civil administration in villages and settlements in the demilitarized zone is provided for, within the framework of an Armistice Agreement, in subparagraphs 5(B) and 5(F) of the draft article. Such civil administration, including policing, will be on a local basis, without raising general questions of administration, jurisdiction, citizenship, and sovereignty.

'Where Israeli civilians return to or remain in an Israeli village or settlement, the civil administration and policing of the village or settlement will be by Israelis. Similarly, where Arab civilians return to or remain in an Arab village, a local Arab administration and police unit will be authorized.

'As civilian life is gradually restored, administration will take shape on a local basis under the general supervision of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission.

'The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, in consultation and co-operation with the local communities, will be in a position to authorize all necessary arrangements for the restoration and protection of civilian life. He will not assume responsibility for direct administration of the zone.'

*Recalls* to the Governments of Syria and Israel their obligations under Article II, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations and their commitments under the Armistice Agreement not to resort to military force and finds that: (A) Aerial action taken by the forces of the Government of Israel on 5 April 1951 and (B) any aggressive military action by either of the parties in or around the demilitarized zone, which further investigation by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization into the reports and complaints recently submitted to the Council may establish, constitute a violation of the cease-fire provision provided in the Security Council resolution of 15 July 1948 and are inconsistent with the terms of the Armistice Agreement and the obligations assumed under the Charter.

*NOTING* the complaint with regard to the evacuation of Arab residents from the demilitarized zone: (A) decides that Arab civilians who have been removed from the demilitarized zone by the Government of Israel should be permitted to return forthwith to their homes and that the Mixed Armistice Commission should supervise their return and rehabilitation in a manner to be determined by the Commission; and (B) holds that no action involving the transfer of persons across international frontiers, armistice lines or within the demilitarized zone should be undertaken without prior decision of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission.

*NOTING* with concern the refusal on a number of occasions to permit observers and officials of the Truce Supervision Organization to enter localities and areas which were subjects of complaints in order to perform their legitimate functions, considers that the parties should permit such entry at all times whenever this is required, to enable the Truce Supervision Organization to fulfil its functions, and should render every facility which may be requested by the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission for this purpose.

*Reminds* the parties of their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to settle their international

disputes by peaceful means in such manner that international peace and security are not endangered and expresses its concern at the failure of the Governments of Israel and Syria to achieve progress pursuant to their commitments under the Armistice Agreement to promote the return to permanent peace in Palestine.

*Directs* the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to take the necessary steps to give effect to this resolution for the purpose of restoring peace in the area and authorizes him to take such measures to restore peace in the area and to make such representations to the Governments of Israel and Syria as he may deem necessary.

*Calls upon* the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to report to the Security Council on compliance given to this resolution.

*Requests* the Secretary-General to furnish such additional personnel and assistance as the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization may request in carrying out this resolution and the Council's resolution of 8 May 1951 and 17 November 1950.

## **North Atlantic Planning Board Establishes Defense Shipping Authority**

*[Released to the press May 25]*

In accordance with its directive from the North Atlantic Council, the North Atlantic Planning Board for Ocean Shipping has agreed on an outline plan for the mobilization of ocean-going shipping in a single pool and its allocation on a worldwide basis in time of war or wartime emergency and for the establishment in such circumstances of any international organization of a civilian character to be named the Defense Shipping Authority.

The objective of the Defense Shipping Authority would be to insure that shipping is so organized as to achieve the greatest possible economy in its employment and to render it effectively and readily available to meet the needs, both military and civil, of the cooperating nations according to approved priorities.

The main principles which would govern the operation of the Defense Shipping Authority are that each participating government should in war or wartime emergency take all the ocean-going merchant ships of its own flag under its own control and place them in a central pool for allocation to employment by the Defense Shipping Authority. Each government would insure that the ships under its control carry out the tasks allotted to them by the Defense Shipping Authority. The arrangements between each government and its shipowners would be the domestic concern of that government but would be of such a nature that individual owners would have no direct interest in the financial results of the employment to which their ships were allocated.

For the purposes of day-to-day operation, two branches would be established, one at Washington and one at London, with all participating governments having the right to be represented in both



branches. While the pool of shipping would be operated as a single unit, the branch at Washington would deal primarily with shipping and the demands for shipping services of the Western Hemisphere, and the London Branch would deal primarily with shipping and the demands for shipping services of the Eastern Hemisphere.

It is intended that, should the Defense Shipping Authority be brought into being, non-NATO countries which participate in the common effort should be invited to place their ocean-going merchant ships in the pool and become members of the Authority.

## THE CONGRESS

### Effectiveness of Fulbright Exchange of Persons Program

[Released to the press by the White House May 11]

*Letter from President Truman to Walter Johnson*

DEAR DR. JOHNSON: I have read with interest the resolution adopted by the Board of Foreign Scholarships on April 7, 1951, and I would like to take this opportunity to thank the members of the Board for their outstanding public service.

The program on which they have been working (created by Public Law 584, 79th Congress, and commonly known as the Fulbright Act) provides for the international exchange of students, professors, research scholars and teachers.

This program is vitally important in widening the knowledge and technical ability of the peoples of the twelve participating countries. Even more important, it is helping us all to understand each other better than ever before. And it is proving effective in combating Communist lies and distortions about social, economic and political conditions and objectives in our respective countries.

The Board of Foreign Scholarships, as well as the Department of State and the binational educational foundations and commissions overseas, is to be commended for the significant success already achieved and for the considerable prestige which is accruing to this program abroad.

I am pleased to accept the resolution of the Board of Foreign Scholarships, to approve the principles it embodies and to reaffirm my unqualified support for the purpose which this program represents.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

### *Text of Board of Foreign Scholarships' Resolution*

WHEREAS: The Board of Foreign Scholarships, authorized by Public Law 584, 79th Congress (The Fulbright Act), has been appointed by the President of the United States to supervise the educational exchange program authorized by such Act; and

WHEREAS: The Board of Foreign Scholarships has carefully supervised the administration of the Fulbright Act since it went into operation; and

WHEREAS: On the recent visit of the Chairman of the Board to twelve countries in which the Fulbright program is operating, it was clearly evident that the program had achieved high prestige and had won the commendation of leaders in these countries as an effective exchange of persons program; and

WHEREAS: The Fulbright program has demonstrated that persons speaking to persons are an effective means of explaining the ideas and aspirations of America to other nations and of these nations to America; and

WHEREAS: The Board feels that the program is making a decided impact in building understanding toward a better and a more peaceful world; therefore, be it

*Resolved:* That the Board of Foreign Scholarships express (1) its commendation for the excellent administration of the Fulbright Act by the Department of State, (2) its deep thanks for the thorough and highly valuable staff work performed by the Department for the Board of Foreign Scholarships, and (3) its confidence that in the continued administration of this program by the Department of State the exchange of persons under the Fulbright Act will make a lasting and significant contribution to the aims and objectives of American foreign policy.

Passed by the Board of Foreign Scholarships at its formal meeting on April 7, 1951, at Washington, D.C., and ordered to be transmitted to the President.

WALTER JOHNSON  
*Chairman, Board of Foreign Scholarships*

### *Résumé of Program*

Since Public Law 584 was enacted on August 1, 1946, the United States Government has signed executive agreements with 20 countries to provide for the international exchange of students, professors, research scholars, and teachers. As a result, 1,907 Americans from the 48 States, the territories, and the District of Columbia have received awards to study, teach, lecture, or conduct research abroad and 1,731 nationals of other countries have received awards for similar projects in the United States. In addition, 646 foreign students have received scholarships for study in American schools

in their home country. It is expected that 3,310 persons will be beneficiaries under this year's program.

The selection of persons and institutions qualified to participate in this program is under the general supervision of the Board of Foreign Scholarships. Members of the Board are appointed by the President and serve without compensation. The Board has met regularly since its first meeting in October 1947, and its present membership is as follows: Walter Johnson, Chairman of the Department of History, University of Chicago, *chairman*; Lewis Webster Jones, President, University of Arkansas, *vice chairman*; Col. John N. Andrews, Personal Representative of the Administrator, Veterans Administration; Sarah Gibson Blanding, President, Vassar College; Margaret Clapp, President, Wellesley College; Charles S. Johnson, President, Fisk University; Earl J. McGrath, United States Commissioner of Education; Martin R. P. McGuire, Professor of Greek and Latin, Catholic University of America; and Helen C. White, Professor of English, University of Wisconsin.

## Legislation

- Importation of Foreign Agricultural Workers. H. Rept. 326, Part 2, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 3283] 6 pp.
- Giving the Department of Commerce the Authority to Extend Certain Charters of Vessels to Citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, and for Other Purposes. H. Rept. 343, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. J. Res. 223] 4 pp.
- Suspension of Deportation of Certain Aliens. H. Rept. 370, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. Con. Res. 9] 2 pp. Also, H. Rept. 371, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. Con. Res. 10] 2 pp.
- India Emergency Assistance Act of 1951. Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. R. 3791, a bill to furnish emergency food relief assistance to India. H. Rept. 373, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 9 pp.
- Report on the Communist "Peace" Offensive. A Campaign to Disarm and Defeat the United States. H. Rept. 378, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 166 pp.
- Permitting Free Entry of Articles Imported from Foreign Countries for the Purpose of Exhibition at the Japanese Trade Fair, Seattle, Wash. H. Rept. 427, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. J. Res. 253] 2 pp.
- Suspending Certain Import Taxes on Copper. Conference Report. H. Rept. 428, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 3336] 2 pp.
- Conveying Hospital Equipment and Making Grants-in-Aid to the Republic of Philippines for Philippine Scouts. H. Rept. 456, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 1216] 5 pp.
- Opposing the Admission of Communist China to Membership in the United Nations. H. Rept. 463, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. Res. 96] 1 p.
- Arms Embargo on Communist China. H. Rept. 464, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. Con. Res. 101] 1 p.
- Reaffirming the Friendship of the American People for all the Peoples of the World, Including the Peoples of the Soviet Union. H. Rept. 466, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. Con. Res. 57] 8 pp.
- Eleventh Report to Congress of the Economic Cooperation Administration. For the Quarter Ended December 31, 1950. H. Doc. 115, 82d Cong. 1st sess.

## FOREIGN SERVICE

### Foreign Buildings Operations Exhibit

*Statement by Secretary Acheson*

[Released to the press May 16]

I should like to call your attention to the Foreign Buildings Operations Exhibit in the lobby. This exhibit illustrates by model or photograph some 48 projects out of a total of more than 500 projects accomplished under the Foreign Service Buildings Program since the end of the war. This program has been geared to meet the greatly increased responsibilities of the United States in foreign affairs in recent years. Primary accent has been placed on the providing of efficient, secure, and representative housing and office space for American personnel abroad.

Of special interest is the method of financing the acquisition or construction and furnishing of these projects. From 1947 through 1950 some 540 projects were completed in 72 countries at a cost of approximately 93 million dollars. Of this total amount, approximately 97 percent was obtained from foreign currency credits arising from the disposal of war surplus, lend-lease settlements, utilization of ECA counterpart funds, and other overseas assets.

The total cost to the taxpayer in new dollar expenditures has been only about 2.3 million dollars, the balance of 90.7 million dollars representing the recovery of foreign-currency credits in the form of these valuable and much needed building assets. In addition, the resulting savings to the taxpayer in annual dollar appropriations, for rental of privately owned quarters, exceeds 5 million dollars annually.

This exhibit is one example of many programs and operations which receives little publicity but which is an integral part of the Department's operations.

### Correction On Slavery Questionnaire

In the BULLETIN of April 30, 1951, page 713, left-hand column, the first five paragraphs should not have appeared. The following introductory paragraphs were omitted:

The Acting Representative of the United States to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honor to refer to the Secretary-General's notes SOA 317/10/02(2)/EL, dated April 14, 1950, and SOA 317/10/02(2), dated December 14, 1950, regarding the Questionnaire on Slavery and Servitude.

The Acting Representative of the United States has the honor to transmit herewith one copy of the Answer of the United States to the United Nations Questionnaire on Slavery and Servitude.

**Aid to Foreign Countries**

- Mutual Security Program, Recommendations to Congress (Truman) . . . . . 883
- Tasks Confronting the Indian Government (McGhee before Cincinnati Council on World Affairs) . . . . . 892

**Arms and Armed Forces**

- Mutual Security Program, Recommendations to Congress (Truman) . . . . . 883
- U. N. Command Operations in Korea: 19th Report (Apr. 1-15, 1951) . . . . . 910

**Asia**

- Global Foreign Policy (Russell before Brotherhood of Railway Clerks Convention, San Francisco) . . . . . 895
- KOREA: U. N. Command Operations, 19th Report (Apr. 1-15, 1951) . . . . . 910
- IRAN: U. S. Position on U. K.-Iran Oil Controversy:
- Alde-mémoire, Text . . . . . 891
  - Remarks (Acheson) . . . . . 891
- PALESTINE: Peace Negotiations:
- Security Council Resolution, Text . . . . . 916
  - Statement (Austin) . . . . . 914
- Tasks Confronting the Indian Government (McGhee before Cincinnati Council on World Affairs) . . . . . 892

**Claims and Property**

- Enemy Property, Settlement of Intercustodial Conflict Involving Enemy Property (Ex. Or. 10244) . . . . . 890
- German Debts, Tripartite Commission on:
- Tripartite Communiqué on Procedures . . . . . 901
  - U. S. Appointment (Gunter) . . . . . 902

**Congress**

- Legislation, Listed . . . . . 919
- MESSAGES FROM PRESIDENT: Mutual Security Program, Recommendations . . . . . 883

**Communism**

- Global Foreign Policy (Russell before Brotherhood of Railway Clerks Convention, San Francisco) . . . . . 895
- Mutual Security Program, Recommendations to Congress (Truman) . . . . . 883
- Tasks Confronting the Indian Government (McGhee before Cincinnati Council on World Affairs) . . . . . 892

**Europe****GERMANY:**

- Critical Materials Export Ban Urged (McCloy Letter to Adenauer) . . . . . 906
- War Criminals Stay of Execution Lifted . . . . . 907
- Tripartite Commission on German Debts:
- Tripartite Communiqué on Procedures . . . . . 901
  - U. S. Appointment (Gunter) . . . . . 902

- SWITZERLAND: Double Taxation Convention Signed . . . . . 907

**U.K.:**

- U. S. Position on Iranian Oil Controversy:
- Alde-Mémoire to Iran, Text . . . . . 891
  - Remarks (Acheson) . . . . . 891

**Foreign Service**

- Foreign Buildings Operations Exhibit (Acheson) . . . . . 919
- GERMANY: Tripartite Commission on Debts, U. S. Appointment (Gunter) . . . . . 902

**Information and Educational Exchange Program**

- Fulbright Act: Effectiveness of Program: Letter (Truman to Johnson); Resolution of Foreign Scholarships, Text; Résumé of Program . . . . . 918

**International Meetings**

- Calendar of Meetings . . . . . 908

**Mutual Aid and Defense**

- Global Foreign Policy (Russell before Brotherhood of Railway Clerks Convention, San Francisco) . . . . . 895
- Mutual Security Program, Recommendations to Congress (Truman) . . . . . 883

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)**

- Planning Board for Ocean Fishing: Defense Plan . . . . . 917

**Presidential Documents**

- CORRESPONDENCE: Board of Foreign Scholarships (Johnson) on Success of Fulbright Program . . . . . 918
- EXECUTIVE ORDERS: Settlement of Intercustodial Conflicts Involving Enemy Property (Ex. Or. 10244) . . . . . 890
- MESSAGES TO CONGRESS: Mutual Security Program, Recommendations.

**Prisoners of War**

- German War Criminals' Stay of Execution Lifted . . . . . 907

**Protection of U.S. Citizens and Property**

- Enemy Property, Settlement of Intercustodial Conflicts Involving (Ex. Or. 10244) . . . . . 890

**Strategic Materials**

- Export Ban to German Trade Violators Urged (McCloy Letter to Adenauer) . . . . . 906
- U. S. Position on U.K.-Iran Oil Controversy:
- Aid-Mémoire to Iran, Text . . . . . 891
  - Remarks (Acheson) . . . . . 891

**Taxation**

- Double Taxation Convention Signed With Switzerland . . . . . 907

**Trade**

- Critical Materials Export Ban to German Trade Violators Urged (McCloy Letter to Adenauer) . . . . . 906

**Transportation**

- NATO Defense Plan for Ocean Shipping . . . . . 917

**Treaties and Other International Agreements**

- PALESTINE: Peace Negotiations . . . . . 914
- SWITZERLAND: Double Taxation Convention Signed . . . . . 907

**United Nations**

- Calendar of Meetings . . . . . 908
- Correction on Slavery Questionnaire . . . . . 919
- Palestine Peace Negotiations:
- Security Council Resolution, Text . . . . . 916
  - Statement (Austin) . . . . . 914
- U. N. Command Operations in Korea, 19th Report (Apr. 1-15, 1951) . . . . . 910
- U. S. in U. N. (Weekly Summary) . . . . . 912

**Name Index**

- Acheson, Secretary Dean . . . . . 891, 907, 919
- Adenauer, Chancellor . . . . . 902, 907
- Austin, Warren R. . . . . 910, 914
- Barnes, Robert G. . . . . 894
- Bruggmann, Charles . . . . . 907
- François-Poncet, Andre . . . . . 904
- Gunter, John W. . . . . 902
- Johnson, Walter . . . . . 918
- Kirkpatrick, Ivone . . . . . 903
- McCloy, John J. . . . . 906, 907
- McGhee, George C. . . . . 892
- Ridgway, General . . . . . 911
- Russell, Francis H. . . . . 895
- Truman, President Harry S. . . . . 883, 890, 918